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Common sense, of course, is not the only thing a system of
law relies on. It is not a substitute for knowledge. It cannot
compete with "expertise." But it is common sense which determines the relevance and weight of knowledge in specific
situations.**
INTRODUCTION

In legal jargon, whether the police may lawfully arrest or search usually depends on whether they have "probable cause."' Unfortunately,
at least for those who relish bright-line mechanical rules, the Supreme
•

Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University.
17 (1957).
I. Certain searches and seizures, however, are permitted without full probable cause. See,
e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
•• S. HOOK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

465

466

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 17:3

Court has never precisely defined this elusive concept. The Court has
said that probable cause to arrest exists when the police have reasonably
trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that an individual has committed a crime. 2 This
definition, however, fails to "structure" analysis for the trained legal
mind. 3
The police may obtain reasonably trustworthy information in two
ways. First, they may observe criminal activity, such as a shooting,
or facts and circumstances from which they draw an inference of
criminal activity. 4 When inferences must be drawn, the probable cause
question under the above definition is whether the reasonably cautious
person would draw the same inferences from the observed facts. Second, the police may receive information from other individuals.
Sometimes informants report facts from which an inference of criminal
activity may be drawn, s but more often they give direct reports of crime,
like "Jones has narcotics in his house" or "Smith is the person who
committed an unsolved crime." In these latter instances, the probable
cause question depends only on whether the informant's report con. stitutes "reasonably trustworthy information." More simply, the question is whether the reasonably cautious person would find the informant's report worthy of belief.
To the gratification of legal minds that thrive on structure, the
Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United .States6 developed a two-pronged
test to evaluate the trustworthiness of an informant's report. Stripped
to its essentials, the test permitted police to rely on an informant's
tip only if they could demonstrate both that the informant was credi2. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). The precise statement reads, "Probable
cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Id.
at 175-76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
3. In Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2355 (1983) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting),
Justice Brennan stressed the need "to structure the inquiry" when police allege probable cause
on the basis of a hearsay report. See also I w. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT§ 3.3, at 136 (Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as w. LAFAVE]; Kamisar,
Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 low AL. REv. 551, 571-72 (1984).
I am grateful to Professor Kamisar for providing me page proofs of his article before its
publication.
4. For example, police may witness an exchange of items and infer from all the circumstances
that a sale of narcotics has occurred. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
5. For example, an informant may report suspicious behavior, but whether the behavior creates
probable cause to arrest or search, or even reasonable suspicion to stop or frisk, will have to
be determined. See, e.g., People v. Rivers, 42 Mich. App. 561, 202 N.W.2d 498 (1972) (repeated
reports of men remaining parked in front of a residence); see also United States v. Bell, 457
F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972) (witnesses described behavior of defendant, but question remained
whether that behavior provided probable cause to believe the defendant had participated in a
robbery).
6. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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ble and that he obtained his information in a reliable way, such as
by personal observation. 7 As Justice White explained in his Spinelli
concurrence, the test's two prongs were independent, for a dishonest
informant may fabricate personal observation, while an honest informant, one not fabricating, may report a casual rumor. 8 With informants from the criminal milieu, the police often satisfied the credibility or veracity prong by indicating that the informant had provided
reliable information on previous occasions; 9 similarly, they could easily satisfy the basis of knowledge prong when the informant personally
observed the reported information.
Of course, the police could not always easily satisfy both prongs.
Difficulties arose, for example, when informants failed to disclose how
they had obtained their information and when informants lacked a
previous track record. Nevertheless, Spinelli indicated that in such cases
circumstantial evidence could satisfy the prongs. The Court suggested
that a tip rich in detail might support an inference that the informant
had obtained his information in a reliable way. 10 As Justice White explained, detailed information "is not usually the subject of casual, dayto-day conversation." 11 Moreover, police corroboration of significant
aspects of the tip could support an inference that the informant was
credible, 12 for as Justice White again explained, with some misgiving,
when an informant "is right about some things, he is more probably
right about other facts . . . . " 13 Understandably, the Court lacked a
litmus test for ascertaining the amount of detail and corroboration sufficient to establish probable cause, and, as Spinelli itself illustrates,
these issues generated intense disagreement. 14 Nevertheless, the twopronged test structured the evaluation of detail and corroboration.
7. Actually, the test was more complicated, because the credibility or veracity prong had
two "spurs." See 1 w. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 3.3{a), at 502 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 178 & n.12 (1983).
For purposes of this article, this intricacy need not be elaborated.
8. 393 U.S. at 424. See also Kamisar, supra note 3, at 556-57.
9. See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 3.3{a), at 502.
10. 393 U.S. at 416-17.
I I. Id. at 426 {White, J ., concurring).
12. Id. at 417-18.
13. Id. at 427 {White, J., concurring). Justice White expressed misgiving about the proper
role of corroboration because verification of innocuous detail cannot, at least as a matter of
logic, tell us whether the informant has been truthful in the critical, incriminating part of the
tip. Id. at 426-27.
14. Justices Black, Fortas, and Stewart dissented in Spinelli. Justice Fortas observed that
the Court unanimously believed that police surveillance could salvage an otherwise defective informant's tip. The majority and dissenters differed, he maintained, over whether it had done
so in this case. 393 U.S. at 438 (Fortas, J ., dissenting). Fortas charged the majority with evaluating
the warrant affidavit as though it were "an entry in an essay contest." Id. Justice Black thought
the warrant affidavit sufficient "for anyone who does not believe that the only way to obtain
a search warrant is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty." Id. at 431
(Black, J ., dissenting).
Spinelli also spawned dispute about the proper role of detail and corroboration in probable
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From the beginning, the two-pronged test provoked controversy. Last
year, in Illinois v. Gates, 15 a narrow majority of the Court supplanted
the two prongs with a "common sense" test based on the "totality
of the circumstances." 16 The Court's opinion referred to probable cause
as a "practical," 11 "fluid," 18 "flexible," 19 "nontechnical" 20 concept
that does not lend itself "to a neat set of rules" 21 like the "complex
superstructure'' 22 Spinelli had imposed. Under this new commonsense approach, the two Spinelli prongs are still relevant, but they will not be
determinative. No longer separate, independent requirements, Spine/li's
two prongs now represent only "closely intertwined issues." 23
The first burden in defending Gates is to demonstrate that the new
approach does indeed comport with common sense. Arguably, the twopronged test itself reflected a commonsense approach for evaluating
hearsay. Whenever we receive information from someone else, we either
explicitly or implicitly ask whether the person is credible and, if so,
whether the person obtained the information in a reliable way. 24 A
commonsense approach for evaluating hearsay cannot ignore these rather
basic questions. Yet, as I will discuss, common sense may not always
require that both these questions have answers.
Part I of this article reviews Oates's actual holding. Although one
can view much of the Court's more interesting discussion of the twopronged test as dicta, the majority and dissenters clearly did not regard

cause analysis. Agreement generally existed that detail could not help with veracity, but disagreement arose over whether corroboration could support the basis of knowledge prong. Compare
Kamisar, supra note 3, at 558-66 (persuasively arguing corroboration relevant to both prongs)
with I W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 3.3(f), at 562-65 (arguing corroboration only relevant
to veracity).
15. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). By resolving the case in the state's favor on probable cause grounds,
the Court avoided the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should be modified. See generally
Kamisar, supra note 3, at 551-52, 585-615.
16. 103 S. Ct. at 2328.
17. Id. at 2328, 2332.
18. Id. at 2328.
19. Id. at 2332, 2333.
20. Id. at 2328, 2331, 2333.
21. Id. at 2328; see also id. at 2333.
22. Id. at 2330.
23. Id. at 2328.
24. In October, 1983, I began a presentation on probable cause to an AALS Criminal Justice
Section Workshop in Chicago by announcing that Chief Justice Burger was planning a news
conference to announce his resignation from the Court. I peppered the announcement with appropriate detail concerning the time, place, and content of the Chief Justice's planned remarks.
Clearly the two relevant questions were, first, whether I was consciously fabricating or reporting
something I believed to be true and, second, if the latter, whether I had obtained my information
in a reliable way. I, of course, stumbled on the first inquiry, although a number of law professors appeared ready to believe the report. I will not speculate whether this tells us anything
about common sense and the two-pronged test.

Probable Cause
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it as such. The majority and dissenters disagreed, however, not only
over the appropriate hearsay test but, more fundamentally, over the
nature of probable cause itself. I will argue that one must resolve this
more basic disagreement before properly addressing the hearsay issue.
Part II examines probable cause from an historical perspective. In
this part, I attempt to demonstrate that both the English common law
and the early American views of probable cause were considerably less
demanding than that of the Gates dissenters. Part III then argues that
the historical conception of probable cause comports with sound policy
and common sense. Part III also outlines the ingredients of a commonsense approach to probable cause issues and discusses the ramifications of this approach for the issue of judicial review.
Part IV returns to the issue of hearsay. Here I maintain that Gates
correctly abandoned the two-pronged test, for under that test probable
cause became a more demanding concept than history or common sense
warranted. I argue that although the Spinelli test in the abstract may
have reflected a commonsense attitude toward hearsay, it proved defective by failing in certain concrete situations to yield either the analysis
or the result of a less structured commonsense approach. By rigidly
requiring the same degree of trustworthiness in all circumstances, the
test relied too much on logic and not enough on experience to decide
what the reasonably cautious police officer would and should do under
the circumstances.
The article concludes with a short postscript describing my overall
approach to fourth amendment analysis.

I.

THE

G_ates

DECISION

On May 3, 1978, police in Bloomingdale, Illinois, a Chicago suburb,
received an anonymous letter implicating Lance and Sue Gates as drug
dealers. The letter indicated that Sue would periodically drive the family
car to Florida and leave it to be loaded with drugs. She would then
fly home to Bloomingdale, and Lance would fly down to Florida to
pick up the car. The letter predicted that Sue would take such a trip
on May 3 and that Lance would fly down to get the car a few days
later. It stated that the car would carry $100,000 worth of drugs and
that another $100,000 in drugs could be found in the Gateses' basement. Finally, the letter accused Sue and Lance of being friends with
big drug dealers and of having bragged about not needing to work. 25
After receiving the letter, police investigation disclosed that an Illinois
driver's license had been issued to a Lance Gates, who lived in Bloomingdale. The police also learned that "L. Gates" had made an Eastern
Airlines reservation to fly to West Palm Beach, Florida, on May 5.
25.

See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1983), where the letter is quoted verbatim.
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On May 5, federal agents observed Lance Gates arrive in West Palm
Beach, take a taxi to a nearby motel, and go to a room registered
to Susan Gates. Early the next morning, Lance and an unidentified
woman 26 left the motel in a Mercury bearing an Illinois license plate
and entered a northbound highway that a person travelling toward
Chicago would typically use. The license plate was registered to a car
owned by the Gateses. 27
Without waiting to learn whether the couple's destination was Chicago
rather than some tourist attraction like Sea World, 28 the police in Illinois
obtained a search warrant for the Gateses' car and their Bloomingdale
home. When the couple arrived in Bloomingdale some twenty-two hours
later, the police searched their car and home, finding drugs and other
evidence. 29 In the Gateses' subsequent trial, however, the court suppressed the seized evidence on the ground that the magistrate had issued
the search warrant without probable cause. The Illinois Supreme Court
agreed, maintaining that the police affidavit failed to satisfy Spinelli's
two-pronged test. 30
A.

Probable Cause and the Two-Pronged Test

Before rejecting Spinelli's approach, the United States Supreme Court
conceded that the letter, standing alone, did not provide probable cause.
The Court found the letter defective because it failed to provide a basis
for concluding that the informant was hones( and because it failed
to indicate how the informant had obtained the information. 3 1 From
the outset, therefore, the Court's analysis suggested that Spinelli's two
prongs would still play a major role in probable cause analysis.
The Court then examined the significance of the police investigation
and surveillance. Somewhat inconsistently, it faulted the Illinois Supreme
Court for applying the same two-pronged test it had just applied to
the letter. 32 The Court suggested that Spinelli's prongs should be viewed
not as "separate and independent requirements" but as "closely in26. Although the woman turned out to be Lance's wife, the police apparently were not sure
of this at the time. See id. at 2326; Kamisar, supra note 3, at 553.
27. The facts are fully set forth in the Court's opinion, 103 S. Ct. at 2325-26.
28. Justice Stevens emphasized this point in his dissent. Id. at 2360 n.3 (Stevens & Brennan, JJ ., dissenting). See also Kamisar, supra note 3, at 554 (finding this point persuasive).
29. 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
30. People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981). The Illinois Court of Appeals
had unanimously upheld the trial judge's suppression order. 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d
77 (1980).
31. 103 S. Ct. at 2326. Justice White agreed with the majority on this point. Id. at 2348
(White, J ., concurring). Because the dissenters obviously agreed with this, the Court was unanimous
in concluding that the letter standing alone did not suffice to establish probable cause. Whether
this conclusion is as evident as the Court thought may be questioned. See infra text accompanying note 72.
32. 103 S. Ct. at 2326-27.

SPRING 1984)

Probable Cause

471

tertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is 'probable cause' to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place." 33
The next section of the Court's opinion further elaborated probable
cause as a flexible, commonsense concept. 34 The Court provided several
reasons for abandoning the two-pronged Spinelli test. It then fashioned
a new test that requires the judge to examine the totality of circumstances, including the informant's veracity and basis of knowledge,
to determine whether a "fair probability" exists that evidence of crime
will be found. 35 Moreover, the Court provided examples to demonstrate
that "a deficiency in one [prong] may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the
other, or by some other indicia of reliability.'' 36
Only in the last section of the opinion did the Court concentrate
on the facts before it. 37 The Court held that the police corroboration
of the informant's predictions that the Gateses' car would be in Florida,
that Lance would soon fly to Florida, and that he would then drive
back to Bloomingdale "indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the
informant's other assertions also were true." 38 Citing Justice White
in Spinelli, the Court observed that when an informant proves right
about some things, he more probably is right about others. 39 Thus,
the Court seems to have concluded that the tip, as corroborated, satisfied
Spinelli's veracity prong. Nevertheless, the Court made a lame attempt
to suggest otherwise:
This may well not be the type of "reliability" or "veracity"
necessary to satisfy some views of the ''veracity prong'' of
Spinelli, but we think it suffices for the practical, commonsense judgment called for in making a probable cause determination. It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause,
that "corroboration through other sources of information
reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale," thus
providing "a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. " 40
33. Id. at 2327-28.
34. The Court's opinion is written in four sections. Section I provided reasons for not addressing the exclusionary rule issue, even though the Court itself had asked the parties to argue
this issue. Id. at 2321-25. Section II set f0rth the facts and rejected the two-pronged test. Id.
at 2325-28. Se_ction III elaborated the reasons for abandoning the two-pronged test. Id. at 2328-34.
Section IV analyzed the facts under the new totality of circumstances approach. Id. at 2334-36.
35. Id. at 2332.
36. Id. at 2329-30.
37. See supra note 34.
38. 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
39. Id. (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,427 (1969) (White, J., concurring)).
See supra text accompanying notes 6-14.
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
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This passage, however, only reinforces my point, for it does not imply
that probable cause existed without the veracity prong; rather, it implies that the Illinois courts applied this prong too stringently. Despite
its disclaimer, the Court's factual analysis seems strikingly similar to
that of concurring Justice White, who preferred to find probable cause
under the Spinelli test. 41
After discussing the informant's veracity, the Court exaµiined the
informant's basis of knowledge, thereby completing its consideration
of Spinelli' s two prongs. Stressing the "range of details" in the letter,
details pertaining to "future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily
predicted, " 42 the Court concluded that the informant most likely obtained his information from either the defendants or someone else
familiar "with their not entirely ordinary travel plans. " 43 Although
the Court stated that the detail may not have been sufficient under
Spinelli to warrant an inference that the informant had a reliable source
of knowledge, 44 its analysis suggests that the Illinois courts demanded too
much in applying this prong of the test. Again, that is, the Court's
analysis seems indistinguishable from that of Justice White, who found
probable cause by applying Spinelli. 45
In short, the opinion's earlier proposition that strength in one prong
can overcome a deficiency in the other proved unnecessary both because the Court did not use this analysis in finding probable cause
and because Gates, in any event, did not lend itself to such analysis.
Gates did not involve unusual strength in one prong and a deficiency
in the other but rather, as the Court's analysis makes clear, a modicum
of strength in each prong - enough in the Court's view to constitute
probable cause. The analysis leaves no doubt that, like Justice White,
the majority would have upheld the search even if it had lacked the
votes to abandon the two-pronged test.
Although the Court's suggestion that hearsay evidence need not satisfy
both prongs seems to be dicta, one cannot overlook the commitment
of a majority of the Court to abandonment of the two-pronged test. 46
41. Id. at 2347-51.
42. Id. at 2335.
43. Id. Even if the informant obtained the information from someone else, we need not worry
about that person's veracity. The police corroboration satisfied the veracity prong without regard
to the actual source of the information. With veracity satisfied - that is, with a basis for concluding that the source, whoever it was, had not fabricated a story - the only remaining issue
was whether the source had obtained the information in a reliable way. For a similar explanation, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425-26 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
44. 103 S. Ct. at 2335-36.
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
46. Lower courts, moreover, now are employing the totality of circumstances test. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sorrells, 714 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d 389
(8th Cir. 1983); Leisure v. Florida, 437 So. 2d 751 (Fla. App. 1983); State v. Arnold, 336 N.W.2d
97 (Neb. 1983). It is not always apparent, however, that the result would have been any different
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One can only speculate why the Court preferred this comparatively
radical step to Justice White's more moderate approach. Perhaps the
majority believed that Justice White's approach would accomplish little
more than the possible conviction of Lance and Sue Gates - arguably
an important objective but hardly a justification for exercising certiorari. Indeed, the Court specifically observed that too many variables
exist in the probable cause equation to have one factual analysis serve
as a useful precedent for another. 47 Just as plausibly, the majority may
have wanted to convey that probable cause itself represents a less demanding concept than the dissenting opinions assumed. Justice Stevens'
dissent may have provided some impetus for this desire, for the most
vulnerable aspect of his dissent, which I will discuss in the next section, is its implicit assertion that probable cause requires a high degree
of certainty.

B.

Gates as a Reflection of Competing
Conceptions of Probable Cause

The Gates opinions advocated several positions. The majority stated
that an informant's tip may provide probable cause without satisfying
Spinelli's two-pronged test. On the facts, the majority found probable
cause under the new totality of circumstances test, but it also strongly
suggested that it would have found probable cause even under Spinelli. 48
Justice White, in his concurrence, steadfastly adhered to Spinelli and,
like the majority, found probable cause. 49 Justices Brennan and Marshall, like Justice White, protested the Court's abandonment of the
Spinelli test. so Although their opinion did not discuss the facts, their
dissent from the judgment makes clear their disagreement with Justice
White's application of Spinelli. 51 Finally, Justices Stevens and Brennan, in a dissent that did discuss the facts, found no probable cause. 5 2
Although somewhat unclear, their opinion suggests the absence of probable cause even under the Court's new test. 5 3
One cannot properly choose among these positions without first adunder the two-pronged test. See Arnold, supra (specifically finding that the two-pronged test
also had been satisfied). In Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2087 (1984) (per curiam),
decided after this article was written, the Supreme Court held that Gates "did not merely refine
or qualify the 'two-pronged test' " but rather "rejected it." Thus, as suggested in the text, the
Court viewed Gates as establishing a new test for evaluating hearsay in probable cause
determinations.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2332 n.11.
48. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2347-51.
50. Id. at 2351-59 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
51. Moreover, Justices Brennan and Marshall specifically stated that they agreed with Justice
Stevens' conclusion that there was no probable cause even under the Court's new test. Id. at 2351.
52. Id. at 2360-62 (Stevens & Brennan, JJ ., dissenting).
53. Justice Stevens alluded to the Court's new test only in a footnote suggesting that both
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dressing the broader issue of the degree of certainty that probable cause
requires. The evaluation of a hearsay report depends on whether one
is applying a reasonable doubt, a preponderance of the evidence, a
more probable than not, or merely a substantial possibility standard.
Thus, we would find it unthinkable to convict a person merely on an
informant's tip, even one that unmistakably satisfies Spinelli's two
prongs: when belief must be sufficiently certain to preclude all reasonable
doubt, evidence must evince more trustworthiness than Spinelli
demanded. 54 Similarly, Spinelli's level of trustworthiness may be inadequate to justify a bindover at the preliminary examination. 55 On
the other hand, a street stop, a detention less intrusive than custodial
arrest, does not require as great a degree of trustworthiness from hearsay
as an arrest demands. 56 When police base contemplated action on hearsay, the trustworthiness they demand of that hearsay inevitably depends
on the level of certainty legally required to take the action; this, in.
turn, depends on the nature of the action itself. The Court, therefore,
has put the cart before the horse, for it has been struggling to define
a trustworthiness test for hearsay without first defining what degree
of certainty probable cause requires.
of Spinelli's prongs were defective in this case. He added, "I do not understand how the Court
can find that the 'totality' so far exceeds the sum of its 'circumstances.' " Id. at 2362 n.8.
See also supra note 51.
54. The sixth amendment right of confrontation partly reflects a concern that only the most
reliable hearsay should be admitted at a criminal trial, and then only if the declarant is unavailable
to testify. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (upholding the admissibility of a witness's
preliminary examination testimony and discussing the restraints on hearsay imposed by the confrontation clause); see also Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory
of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 578 (1978) (the confrontation clause
"requires the state, wherever possible, to present its evidence against the accused in what is traditionally considered the most reliable form, that of direct testimony in open court").
55. Jurisdictions vary in applying the rules of evidence at the preliminary examination. See
Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 997-99 (5th ed. 1980). Some
rules explicitly state that probable cause may be based "in whole or in part" on hearsay. See,
e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.l(a). Nevertheless, even in jurisdictions applying such rules, one does
not find cases in which a defendant has been bound over for trial on a police officer's testimony
that an anonymous informant, with a reliable track record, reported that he had personally observed
narcotics in the defendant's house. The "probable cause" required to hold a defendant for trial
is obviously more demanding than the "probable cause" needed to justify an arrest; were it
otherwise, the preliminary examination would fail to remove any weak cases from the system.
Because of the more rigorous probable cause standard at the preliminary examination, greater
reliability is demanded from hearsay information.
56. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). Although this point may seem trivial,
not all commentators have recognized it. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 50, 178 (1972):
Probable cause is determined both by the quantum and content of the information
an officer possesses and by the degree of its reliability. The two are nevertheless distinct
concepts and a case can certainly be made that the standard of cause to stop should
be less than probable cause only in the sense that the officer may stop on less or
different information than probable cause would require and not in the sense that
he may act on information that is received in a manner less reliable than probable
cause would require.
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Yet, it also seems evident that members of the Court hold different
conceptions of probable cause. Justice Stevens' dissent in Gates, for
example, suggests that his disagreement with the majority stems not
simply from a different approach to hearsay but, more basically, from
a more demanding conception of probable cause itself. Justice Stevens
found it important that the informant's tip had not proved completely
accurate: although the informant had reported that Sue Gates would
leave the car in Florida and fly back to Bloomingdale, police surveillance
disclosed that Lance Gates checked into the motel room registered to
Sue Gates and left the next morning with a woman, presumably his
wife. Stevens attached significance to this discrepancy because the
described modus operandi implied, in his view, that the defend ants
did not want to leave the alleged $100,000 worth of drugs unguarded
in their basement. 57 That they left their home unguarded, Stevens
argued, cast doubt on the informant's claim that drugs were stored
there. 58 In addition, Stevens insisted, the discrepancy made the couple's activities less suspicious. First, the police did not know that Sue
Gates went to Florida on May 3; for all they knew, she could have
been there a month. 59 Second, the highway that leads to Chicago also
leads to several tourist attractions in Florida. 60
Of course, one may quarrel with Justice Stevens about whether the
described modus operandi implied that the defendants did not want
to leave their home unguarded. As the majority maintained in a footnote, one may question whether the magistrate (or the police) ever
recognized this implication, 61 or whether it represented the work of
a lawyer who had pored over the warrant affidavit in search of possible challenges. 62 Moreover, as the majority again recognized, Justice
Stevens' argument suggested that the defendants were worried about
the drugs in their unguarded home but not about those in their unguarded car in Florida. 63 Finally, without questioning that post-search
knowledge cannot provide antecedent cause for a search, one may nevertheless note that the defendants did leave the drugs in their unguarded
home. This fact suggests the need for caution before one reads into
What the note's author overlooked, of course, is that the quantum of evidence required necessarily
has a bearing on the rigor with which we will examine hearsay.
57. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2360 (1983) (Stevens & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
Respected commentators have agreed with Justice Stevens on this point. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 3, § 3.3(f), at 161; Kamisar, supra note 3, at 554.
58. 103 S. Ct. at 2360 (Stevens & Brennan, JJ ., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2360 n.1.
60. Id. at 2360 n.3. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
61. Id. at 2335-36 n.14.
62. This, of course, is one of the costs of the exclusionary rule, for effective lawyers view
it as their responsibility to raise all conceivable challenges. This does not explain, however, why
law professors seem similarly inclined to second-guess probable cause determinations with such
studied analysis. See supra note 57.
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2335-36 n.14.
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the informant's letter the implication that seemed so obvious to Justice
Stevens. 64
To quarrel with Justice Stevens on these grounds, however, misses
the point. Of more significance is that Justice Stevens, unlike either
the majority or Justice White, seized upon possible innocent explanations for the Gateses' behavior to reject a finding of probable cause.
Certainly it was possible that Sue Gates had spent a month in Florida
waiting for her husband, and it was likewise possible that the couple
had set out early in the morning for Sea World. 65 The likelihood of
these possibilities, however, is the important issue. By not discussing
their likelihood, the Stevens opinion creates the impression that the
mere possibility of innocent explanations is sufficient to defeat probable cause. 66
Perhaps it is unfair to attribute this view to Justice Stevens, for his
dissent may suggest only that the information on which the police obtained their search warrant equally supported inferences of innocent
behavior and criminal activity. The relevance of this view of the probabilities, however, depends on an assumption that probable cause requires criminal activity to be more probable than not. In mathematical
terms, this reading of Justice Stevens' dissent assumes that probable
cause is lacking if criminal activity is forty, or even fifty, percent likely.
Such a premise seems clearly implicit in Justice Stevens' analysis for
nowhere does he assert, nor could he do so convincingly, 67 that no
substantial possibility of criminal activity existed in Gates.
The majority's opinion, on the other hand, is consistent with a
substantial possibility standard; furthermore, it actually hints that such
a standard should govern. At one point, the Court stated that probable cause requires evidence sufficient not for condemnation but only
to warrant "suspicion. " 68 Although acknowledging the infeasibility
of adopting a numerically precise standard, the Court asserted that
probable cause requires "only the probability, and not a prima facie
showing of criminal activity .... " 69 The Court followed this assertion
with a citation to a Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure section

64. Ignoring this fact, Professor Kamisar recently wrote with confidence that the discrepancy
"casts doubt on the hypothesis that they [the Gateses] kept a large quantity of drugs in their
home and therefore did not want to leave it unguarded." Kamisar, supra note 3, at 554.
65. Justice White, who concurred in the judgment, conceded these possibilities. 103 S. Ct.
at 2349 & nn.23-24.
66. If this is what Justice Stevens meant to suggest, the majority was certainly correct in
responding that probable cause "simply does not require the perfection the dissent finds necessary."
l03 S. Ct. at 2335 n.14. See also id. at 2349 (White, J., concurring) (probable cause does not
require proof of "certain guilt").
67. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
68. l03 S. Ct. at 2330 (quoting Locke v. United States, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813)).
69. l03 S. Ct. at 2330.
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that specifically rejects a more probable than not standard. 10 Similarly, the Court stated in a subsequent footnote that probable cause requires "only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity,
not an actual showing of such activity.'' 11
Under a substantial chance or substantial possibility standard, of
course, one can easily defend the majority's finding of probable cause
in Gates. Initially, one may empirically question whether many letters
like that received in Gates are fabricated. 72 I do not mean to suggest
that the letter standing alone provides probable cause; nevertheless,
this question is sobering, because it reveals our reluctance to find probable cause even when our doubts are not grounded in experience. The
partly corroborated letter, however, certainly suggests a substantial
likelihood, if not an actual probability, that Lance and Sue Gates went
to Florida to purchase drugs. Of course, as Justice White conceded,
the possibility remained that a vindictive travel agent, knowing of the
couple's travel plans, was trying to harass them, 73 but this possibility
could coexist with a conclusion that criminal activity was also substantially possible. At the least, the facts make it difficult to maintain that

70. Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 210.1(7), at 3 I and 33 (Proposed Official Draft 1972)). The provision remained the same in the 1975 Proposed Official Draft.
See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 210.1(7), at 121 (Proposed Official Draft,
Complete Text and Commentary 1975). The commentary to this section explicitly rejects a more
probable than not standard. Id., commentary at 499-500.
The Court added a second citation, "W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 3.2(3) (1978)."
The citation is incorrect, for LaFave's subsections are lettered rather than numbered. The Court,
however, may have intended to cite§ 3.2(e), for in this subsection Professor LaFave discusses whether
probable cause imposes a more probable than not standard. See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 7,
§ 3.2(e), at 476-93. LaFave also indicates in this subsection that there is much support for the
Model Code's position. Id. at 480. But see id. at 484 (stating "that there is a basis for being
more demanding with respect to the existence of criminal activity than with respect to the identity
of the perpetrator of a known crime").
71. 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n. 13 (emphasis added).
The Court's intimatio_ns that probable cause does not impose a more probable than not standard seem quite deliberate. Moreover, they are consistent with a more explicit statement made
earlier in the Court's term. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1983) (plurality opinion)
(describing probable cause as "a flexible, ·common-sense standard ... merely requir[ing] that
the facts available would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' ... that certain
items may be useful as evidence, ... but not demand[ing] any showing that such a belief be
correct or more likely true than false"). Given these remarks in both Gates and Brown, one
cannot read the words "probability" and "fair probability," also used in these cases, to mean
more probable than not. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983) (magistrate
must decide whether "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place").
Professor Kamisar puts the matter more strongly than I: "The Court made it fairly clear,
I think, that 'probable cause' is something less than 'more-probable-than-not' . . . . " Kamisar,
supra note 3, at 588 (emphasis his).
72. I am grateful to Professor Phillip Johnson of the University of California, Berkeley, Law
School for raising this question with me in a telephone conversation.
73. 103 S. Ct. at 2349 (White, J ., concurring).
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a reasonably cautious person could not have concluded that a substantial possibility of criminal activity existed. 74
Gates, therefore, raises the significant issue of whether a substantial
possibility standard, or perhaps even a reasonable suspicion standard,
suffices for determining probable cause. Two arguments suggest that
no more should be required. First, probable cause has historically been
a much less demanding concept than Justice Stevens assumed in his
Gates dissent. Second, policy reasons, grounded in common sense, support a standard significantly lower than the more probable than not
standard. Indeed, common sense suggests that probable cause should
be a variable concept whose demands depend on the circumstances.

II.

PROBABLE CAUSE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The relevance of history in formulating contemporary standards of
probable cause may be disputed. In particular, English history may
seem inapposite, for the colonists rebelled against English search and
seizure practices. 7 5 Moreover, no evidence exists to indicate that the
framers intended to codify for all time a particular conception of probable cause. 76 Nevertheless, the historical background does have contemporary relevance. First, the early understanding of probable cause
provides perspective for the current debate. Second, both in England
and in the colonies, the advocates of search and seizure protections
rebelled not against common law search and seizure practices in ordinary criminal cases but rather against official unwillingness to adhere
to the common law rules in politically controversial contexts. In England,
the major search and seizure battles arose over the Crown's use of
74. Professor Lafave suggests that the police should have patiently conducted further investigation such as waiting until they could confirm that the Gateses had indeed returned to
Illinois. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 3.3, at 162. This suggestion has its own difficulties. How
far should the police have followed the Gateses? Should the police simply have waited al the
Gateses' home? If they did the latter, could the police have immediately searched the Gateses
upon their return, or would the circumstances have been insufficiently exigent to justify a warrantless search? Would any of this delay have increased the risk of losing relevant evidence? Assume,
however, that LaFave's alternative investigative procedures are reasonable. This would not prove
that the alternative actually employed was unreasonable. The reasonably cautious person's conclusions cannot be faulted, or at least should not be, as long as they fall within a zone of
reasonableness. In this regard, one should recall that the police did not act precipitously but
instead obtained a search warrant. LaFave's real burden, therefore, is to show not that he would
have refused to issue the warrant, a burden he has successfully carried, but rather that the magistrate
acted outside the zone of reasonableness in concluding that further investigation was not warranted. In my view, neither Lafave nor any of the judges who voted to reverse the issuing magistrate
has begun to satisfy this burden. On the issue of judicial review, see infra notes 252-86 and
accompanying text.
75. See generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-20, 30-38
{1966); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 51-79 (1937).
76. See Johnson, Who's Afraid of the Good Faith Exception 7 (1983) (unpublished paper
delivered at the AALS Criminal Justice Section Workshop in Chicago, October 1983).
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general warrants, which were not supported by probable cause, to enforce both oppressive licensing laws and laws punishing seditious libel. n
In the colonies, James Otis and others took issue with writs of
assistance, 78 which the British used to enforce not only unpopular but,
in the colonists' view, illegitimate customs laws. 79 Finally, the English
history reflects a view of probable cause that both the framers and
the early Supreme Court cases appear to have shared.

A.

The English View

1. Statutes and Commentators- The early common law did not
require a high level of suspicion to justify an arrest. For example, a
statute promulgated in the late thirteenth century under Edward I required town guards to arrest strangers after sunset. The guards were
to release the strangers the next morning "if no Suspicion be found,"
but they were to turn the strangers over to the constable if they found
"Cause of Suspicion. " 80 Apparently this power of arrest did not suffice to abate robberies, manslaughters, and other felonies, because,
almost fifty years later in the reign of Edward III, a supplemental statute
required constables, by day or night, to arrest any man who
demonstrated an "evil suspicion" of being such an offender. 81 The
new statute also required the constables to deliver the arrestees to bailiffs
or sheriffs, who were to ''enquire of such Arrests, and at the coming
of the Justices return their Enquests before them, with that which they
have found, and the Causes of the Takings. " 82 Thus, an arrest prompted
further investigation; it did not reflect an already formed decision to
charge the person with a crime. 83
The early statutes did make some distinctions based upon the level
of suspicion justifying the arrest, although in doing so they confirmed
77. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 75, at 20-30; N. LAssoN, supra note 75, at 24-50.
78. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 140-42 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965), reprinted
in I B. SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 189-90 (1971) (reporting Otis's denunciation of general warrants and his concession that special warrants were legal). See also N. LASSON
supra note 75, at 58-60; Quincy, Massachusetts Reports, Appendix I, 404 (1865).
79. For a discussion of how colonial thinking evolved to the point of denying the legitimacy
of British authority, see c. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 80-134 (1922). See
also E. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-89 at 14-27 (rev. ed. 1977).
80. Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, stat. 2, c. 4 (1285). Coke reported that the statute
was directed at "roberdsmen," men who patterned their behavior after Robin Hood. 3 E. COKE,
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 197 (1628).
81. Statute of Westminster, 5 Edw. 3, c. 14 (1331). This statute made reference both to the
previous statute and to the continued commission of manslaughters, robberies, and felonies.
82. Id.
83. But cf. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957) (stating in dictum that "[i]t
is not the function of the police to arrest . . . at large and to use an interrogating process at
police headquarters in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing magistrate
on 'probable cause' ").
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that arrests did not require a substantial level of antecedent cause. For
example, a 1275 statute imposing harsh penalties on those who refused to submit to the common law of the land exempted those prisoners
"as be taken of light suspicion." 84 Similarly, a statute denying bail
to many prisoners likewise exempted those arrested "of light
suspicion." 85 Three hundred years later, however, a superseding statute
imposed new restrictions on bail. The statute's preamble complained
that judges were too readily releasing prisoners on the excuse that they
had been arrested "only for Suspicion of Felony." 86
Throughout the centuries, English statutes continued to rely on the
notion of "suspicion." In the late seventeenth century, for example,
a statute authorizing search warrants for illegally killed game enabled
constables to search, "in such Manner, and with such Power as in
cases where Goods are stolen or suspected to be stolen," those places
belonging to "suspected Persons. " 87 This statute provided that a
successful search justified the person's arrest, 88 thus suggesting that
"suspicion" inadequate to justify arrest might still warrant a search.
Writing in the seventeenth century, Sir Matthew Hale viewed as
settled the authority of a constable lawfully to arrest an individual based
on a third party's report that he "suspect[ed]" the individual upon
"probable grounds" to be a felon. 89 Anticipating the United States
Supreme Court, Hale expressed concern about the reliability of such
hearsay reports, but his suggested safeguards were not as elaborate
as Spinelli's two-pronged test. Hale indicated that the constable should
inquire into the causes and circumstances of such a report so that he
could make the third party's suspicion his own. 90
Hale used the terms "suspicion, " 91 "probable cause of suspicion, " 92
and "reasonable cause of suspicion" 93 interchangeably. It seems evident, however, that Hale used all these terms to indicate that the constable needed some basis for suspecting a particular individual but
84. Statute of Westminster, the First, 3 Edw. I, c. 12 (1275).
85. Id. c. 15. The exact meaning of this statute is unclear. Stephen read the statute as making
bailable those "indicted" on light suspicion, and he was not sure whether persons arrested on
suspicion pursuant to a hue and cry could be bailed. I J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 235 (1883).
86. I & 2 Phil. & Mar. c. 12, § I (1554); see also 2 & 3 Phil. & Mar. c. 10, § 2 (1555)
(requiring the justice of the peace to conduct an orderly examination of all those arrested "for
Manslaughter or Felony, or for Suspicion thereof" before committing them to jail).
87. 3 Will. & Mar. C. 10, § 3 (1691).
88. Id.
89. 2 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 91 (1736). Hale's two volume
treatise was published posthumously.
90. Id. at 91-92. Hale also indicated that the person with the suspicion "ought to be present"
when the arrest is made. Id. at 91.
91. See, e.g., IM. HALE, supra note 89, at 582-583; 2 id. at 79, 80-90, 91, 101, 113, 150.
92. See, e.g., I id. at 580, 588; 2 id. at 78, IOI ("probably suspected"), 103, 150.
93. See, e.g., id. at 78, 79 ("reasonableness of the suspicion").
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not for singling out that individual from the group of all other possible suspects. Hale indicated, for example, that the "probable causes
of suspicion" included "common fame" and being with a person who
committed a felony. 94 Hale emphasized, however, that a person arrested only on suspicion might not be bound over for trial, because
upon examination the magistrate might acquire cause to discharge him. 95
Hale did not distinguish between the level of suspicion required for
warrantless searches or seizures and those authorized by warrants. Unlike
Coke, who had maintained that a magistrate could not issue a preindictment arrest warrant, 96 Hale insisted, irrefutably according to
Blackstone, 97 that a justice of the peace could issue a warrant when
an individual under oath "show[ed] probable cause of suspicion. " 98
Hale's description of the common law hue and cry even more
94. I id. at 588; 2 id. at 80; see also 2 w. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN c. 12, §§ 8-14 at 76, listing as sufficient causes of suspicion "common fame of the
country" when it had "some probable ground," living as a vagrant, being in the company of
a known offender at the time of the offense, "generally at other times keeping company with
persons of scandalous reputations," and being found with stolen goods. The following statement
of the law occurred in Ashley's Case, 12 Coke Rep. 90, 92, 77 Eng. Rep. 1366, 1368 {K.B. 1611):
[l]f felony be done, and one hath suspicion upon probable matter that another is guilty
of it, because that he had part of the goods robbed, and is indigent, or if the party
be indicted, or if murder be committed, and one is seen near the place, or coming
with a sword or other weapon embrued with blood, or that he was in company of
felons, or hath carried the goods stolen to obscure places, or such like things, these
are good causes of suspicion; and by reason of this he may arrest the party so suspected
The court also indicated that it was good cause for arrest that the "common fame and voice
is that one hath committed" a felony. Id. See generally Weber, The Birth of Probable Cause,
11 ANGLO-AMER. L. REV. 155, 162-63 {1982).
The court in Ashley's Case suggested that the person who held the suspicion had to make
the arrest, but Hale indicated that this was true only when a private party arrested another.
A constable could arrest on the basis of a third party's suspicion. 2 M. HALE, supra note 89,
at 80. Ultimately, Hale thought that even this restriction on private parties was not that great:
But then the case is easily solved, for if a felony be committed, and A. hath probable
cause to suspect B. and accordingly suspects B. and acquaints C. with the whole matter, C. upon his having probable cause to suspect B. though he cannot justify the
imprisonment of B. as by command of A. that first suspected him, he may justify
by his own suspicion; and the like of him that comes in aid of A. to arrest B.
Id. {emphasis in original).
95. I M. HALE, supra note 89, at 581. Hale indicated that the judge issuing an arrest warrant
had to bind the accusing party to prosecute only if the accusation was "positive and express."
A suspicion insufficient to support the charge without further investigation, however, could not
provide the basis for binding over the accusing party to prosecute, because the accused would
not have been given an opportunity to rebut the charge. Id. See also M'Cloughan v. Clayton
& Riding, Holt 478, 480, 171 Eng. Rep. 311, 312 (K.B. 1816) (holding that a constable could
arrest "on suspicion upon a reasonable charge of felony" and, without bringing the person to
court, could then release him if the suspicion proved groundless).
96. 4 E. Coke, supra note 80, at 176-77.
97. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 290 (1765-69).
98. 2 M. HALE, supra notes 89, at 107. Hale accused Coke of condemning, with little support, the "constant and usual practice" and of stating a view that, if accepted, would "give
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graphically illustrates that the requirement of antecedent suspicion was
not sufficiently demanding to preclude the arrest of several suspects
for a single felony offense. On report of a felony, the constable had
an obligation to raise a hue and cry so that a search for the offender
could be conducted from town to town. The constable's obligation
existed even when the person reporting the felony could not provide
any leads to help identify the offender. In such cases other causes of
suspicion could still justify arrests. 99
[A]ll that can be done is for those that pursue the hue and
cry to take such persons, as they have probable cause to suspect;
as jor instance, such persons as are vagrants, that cannot give
an account where they live, whence they are, or such suspicious
persons as come late into their inn or lodgings, and give no
reasonable account where they had been, and the like. 100
The use of the hue and cry procedure even when the constable was
uncertain that a felony had been committed further demonstrates the
laxity of the common law suspicion requirement. 101
Although probable cause of suspicion thus did not require more than
a reasonable basis for suspecting the individual and making further
inquiry, the concept still had teeth. Hale made clear that a general
warrant upon a complaint of robbery "to apprehend all persons
suspected" was void. 102 As Blackstone later explained, when a constable obtained a warrant, it was "the duty of the magistrate, and ought
not be left to the officer, to judge of the ground of suspicion." 103
Similarly, magistrates could issue warrants to search for stolen goods
on "suspicion," 104 but Hale doubted the validity of general warrants
"to search all places, whereof the party and officer have suspicion." 105
As Hale expressed it:
[A] general warrant to search in all suspected places is not good,
a loose to felons to escape unpunished in most cases." See also id. at 149-50 (Hale, again disagreeing
with Coke, discussing the issuance of warrants to search for stolen goods).
99. "But if the hue and cry be upon a robbery, burglary, manslaughter, or other felony
committed, but the person that did the fact, is neither known nor describable by person, clothes,
or the like, yet such a hue and cry is good, as hath been said, and must be pursued, though
no person certain be named or described." Id. at 103.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
IOI. Id. at 101-02. Contrast Professor LaFave's view that more certainty should be required
in determining that a crime has occurred than in connecting a defendant to a known crime.
See supra note 70.
102. I M. HALE, supra note 89, at 580; 2 id. at 112.
l03. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at 291.
l04. 2 M. HALE, supra note 89, at 113.
105. Id. at 114; see also id. at 150.
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but only to search in such particular places, where the party
assigns before the justice his suspici~n and the probable cause
thereof, for these warrants are judicial acts, and must be granted
upon examination of the fact.
And therefore I take those general warrants dormant, which
are made many times before any felony committed; are not
justifiable, for it makes the party to be in effect the judge;
and therefore searches made by pretense of such general warants
give no more power to the officer or party, than what they
may do by law without them. 106

2. Judicial Opinion- The eighteenth century English cases that
perhaps most influenced the framers of the American Constitution involved general warrants. 101 In Money v. Leach, 108 for example, the Earl
of Halifax, one of the King's Secretaries of State, issued a warrant
authorizing his messengers to search for the "authors, printers and
publishers" of an allegedly libelous publication. 109 The warrant failed
to specify the person or persons to be arrested, and only after the warrant had issued did one of the messengers receive information that the
plaintiff, Leach, had printed the particular paper. 110 The messengers
arrested Leach and searched his house, but the Secretary subsequently
discharged him because it appeared that he had not printed the libelous
paper. 111 Leach subsequently won a suit for damages, and the messengers
then appealed. Responding to this appeal, Lord Mansfield first observed
that the common law did not permit warrantless arrests in cases like
this. 112 Second, relying on Hale, Mansfield noted that general warrants
were contrary to the common law. 113 Mansfield conceded that common usage could make law, but he found that although general warrants had previously been used, they had been the practice of only

106. Id. at I 50. This last sentence suggests that some power to search could be exercised
without a warrant. A defective warrant, however, could not provide a justification that other•
wise would not have existed. The next two cases in the text involved situations in which a lawful
search could not have been conducted without a warrant. See infra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
107. See N: LASSON, supra note 75, at 45-46 & n.114.
108. 3 Burr. 1742, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 {K.B. 1765).
109. Id. at 1742-43, 1747, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1076, 1078.
110. Nathan Carrington told the defendants that a printer, whose name he did not disclose,
informed him that plaintiff Leach had printed the paper in question. Id. at 1748, 97 Eng. Rep.
at 1078-79.
Ill. Id. at 1749, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1079.
112. Id. at 1766, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088. Because no authority for the defendants' actions
existed outside the warrant, the warrant's validity was at issue. See supra note 106. As it turned
out, the judges decided the case on a narrower ground, thus rendering the comments about general
warrants dicta. 3 Burr. at 1767-68, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088-89.
113. Id. at 1767, 97 Eng. Rep. 1088.
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a "particular office." 114 Nothing in Lord Mansfield's opinion suggests
disapproval of the common law's reasonable suspicion standard; on
the contrary, Mansfield specifically said that a jury should determine
the existence of "a probable cause or ground of suspicion." 115
Similarly, Entick v. Carrington/ 16 perhaps the most famous of the
English cases, involved a warrant specific as to the person to be arrested but general as to the items to be seized. This warrant, also issued
by the Earl of Halifax, identified Entick as the author of several seditious
writings. It commanded Halifax's messengers to seize both Entick and
all his books and papers, the latter to be examined by the Secretary. 1 1 7
Executing the warrant, the messengers made a thorough search of Entick's dwelling, broke open boxes, chests and drawers, and seized at
least two hundred pamphlets and printed charts. 118 Upon subsequent
examination, the Secretary's assistant found insufficient cause to charge
Entick with a crime. Entick then brought a suit against the messengers
for damages.
Lord Camden's opinion in Entick touched on several issues. Toward
the end of the opinion, he suggested that a search for evidence, as
opposed to one for stolen goods, was simply impermissible, -even in
ordinary felony cases. 119 Recognizing the possibility of overstatement
in this claim, he insisted nevertheless that such searches should be
disallowed as unnecessary at least in libel cases. 120 In earlier sections
of his opinion, however, Lord Camden had more narrowly complained about the warrant's lack of particularity. He contrasted the
Secretary's general warrant, which required seizure of all papers for
subsequent examination, with warrants issued under an earlier Licensing Statute, which permitted seizure only of "suspected libels." 121

114. Id. Actually, as Hale had recognized, some precedent did exist for general warrants,
although Hale thought the precedent dubious. 2 M. HALE, supra note 89, at 114. For information on the English use of general warrants in the seventeenth century to enforce both licensing
and customs laws, see N. LASSON, supra note 75, at 28-34, 37-39.
115. 3 Burr. at 1765, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1087. See also id. at 1766, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1087 (there
might be "sufficient cause of suspicion" even though person arrested turned out to be innocent).
What was troublesome, therefore, was not that the warrant authorized arrest upon reasonable
suspicion, but that the suspicion was evaluated by the messengers instead of the person issuing
the warrant. Id. at 1766, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088.
I 16. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765). As the editor
explained, the report in the State Trials is more complete than the reports of the case elsewhere.
The former was purportedly based on a copy of Lord Camden's original opinion, which he
was thought to have destroyed. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029-30. Subsequent citations are to this source.
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886), the United States Supreme Court described Entick as a landmark of English liberty.
117. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1030-31.
I 18. Id. at 1030-32.
I 19. Id. at 1066-67, 1073-74.
120. Id. at 1074.
121. Id. at 1069-70; see also id. at 1065.
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Similarly, he contrasted general warrants with search warrants for stolen
goods:
[I]n the case before us, nothing is described, nor distinguished;
no charge is requisite to prove, that the party has any criminal
papers in his custody; no person present to separate or select;
no person to prove in the owner's behalf the officer's
misbehavior. -To say the truth, he cannot easily misbehave,
unless he pilfers; for he c;annot take more than all. 122
Like Lord Mansfield in Leach, Lord Camden did not discuss the
level of cause needed to justify an arrest or a search. He did say at
one point, however, that if the Secretary's warrant was found valid,
"the secret cabinets and bureaus" of everyone would be subject to
search whenever the Secretary thought it appropriate ''to charge, or
even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of
a seditious libel." 123 This sentence, however, cannot be read as challenging the common law's reasonable suspicion standard, for Lord Camden
was careful to adhere to precedent even when he vehemently disagreed
with it. 12 • Rather, this sentence, read in context, makes it clear that
the general warrant, or perhaps any warrant for papers, whether general
or special, 125 posed the problem. Under the common law, reasonable
suspicion permitted a seizure of the person or a limited search for and
seizure of goods; under the Secretary's search warrants, by contrast,
no lock or door could be left unbroken, for "nothing is left either
to the discretion or to the humanity of the officer." 126
The eighteenth-century libel cases failed to disturb the common law
conception of probable cause as Hale had described it. This became
evident in subsequent criminal cases. In Samuel v. Payne, 121 decided
in 1780, the complainant Hall accused the plaintiff of stealing some
laces, which he claimed were in the plaintiff's house. On the basis of
this accusation, a justice of the peace issued a search warrant. Although
the constable failed to find the stolen laces, he nevertheless arrested
the. plaintiff. In a subsequent suit for damages after his discharge, the
122. Id. at 1067.
123. Id. at 1063.
124. The first question before the Court was whether the secretary had statutory authority
to issue warrants. After spending considerable time examining this question, Lord Camden expressed the view that such authority had been improperly assumed. Id. at 1045-58. Nevertheless,
precedent upheld the Secretary's authority, and Lord Camden and his brothers reluctantly concluded that they had "no right to overturn those decisions." Id. at 1058-59.
125. See supra notes 119 & 120 and accompanying text.
126. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1064. Lord Camden expressly recognized that the common law permitted a constable to arrest, even kill, a person suspected of felony, but he insisted that other
safeguards, not present in the search for papers, reduced the likelihood of abuse. Id. at 1065 n. *.
127. I Doug. 359, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1780).
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plaintiff maintained that the constable had the burden of proving that
a felony had actually been committed. Writing for the court, Lord
Mansfield, who had denounced general warrants in Money v. Leach, 128
disagreed. When a person charges another with a felony, Mansfield
wrote, ''it would be most mischievous that the officer should be bound
first to try, and at his peril exercise his judgment on the truth of the
charge." 129 Mansfield insisted that when such a complaint is made,
the officer does his duty by taking the person accused before a
magistrate, who can commit or discharge him. 130
Samuel v. Payne quickly became a leading English case. 131 In
M'Cloughan v. Clayton & Riding, 132 the court relied on it to sustain
a constable's search of an individual who had been accused of stealing
a coat. 133 The accuser, Riding, presented no evidence to support his
suspicion, and the constable's search in fact proved fruitless. Nevertheless, the court observed that a constable can apprehend "on suspicion upon a reasonable charge of felony." 134 The court added that
having found his suspicion groundless, the constable was entitled to
release the defendant without bringing him before a magistrate. 135
From a contemporary American perspective, some of the English
cases are truly remarkable. In Lawrence v. Hedger, 136 for example,
a watchman arrested the plaintiff at ten o'clock one night on a London street when he failed to account for a bundle he was carrying.
Although no theft had been reported, all three judges upheld the arrest.
One judge, citing Payne, expressed bewilderment that the arrest had
been challenged: "And in this case, what do you talk of groundless
suspicion? There was abundant ground of suspicion." 137 Similarly, in
Beckwith v. Philby 138 a constable made an arrest after a farmer pointed
out a man resting near a bridge with a bridle and saddle on his back.
Although the man explained that he was returning from having sold
a horse at a nearby market, the constable believed the man was either
stealing or about to steal a horse. The court concluded that the constable had reasonable cause to make the arrest. 1 39
128. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
129. I Doug. at 360, 99 Eng. Rep. at 231.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., White v. Taylor, 4 Esp. 80, 170 Eng. Rep. 648 (K.B. 1801); Stonehouse v.
Elliott, I Esp. 271, 170 Eng. Rep. 354 (K.B. 1795).
132. Holt 478, 171 Eng. Rep. 311 (N.P. 1816).
133. Id. at 482, 171 Eng. Rep. at 313 (citing Payne).
134. Id. at 480, 171 Eng. Rep. at 312.
135. Id; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text; accord Davis v. Russell, 5 Bing.
354, 130 Eng. Rep. 1098 (C.P. 1829).
136. 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C.P. 1810).
137. Id. at 16, 128 Eng. Rep. at 7.
138. 6 Bar. & Cress 635, 108 Eng. Rep. 585 (K.B. 1827).
139. Id. at 638-39, 108 Eng. Rep. at 586. It is worth noting that the constables (the one
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The law did not differ in search warrant cases. In Jones v. German 140
an individual named Wood stated under oath that he had "just and
reasonable cause" to believe that his butler, Jones, whom he had just
discharged after five years of service, was stealing his property. In support of this accusation, Wood indicated only that Jones had refused
to let him inspect several boxes that he had just packed. 141 On this
complaint, the defendant magistrate issued a warrant. Although some
of Wood's goods were found when the warrant was executed, Wood
did not press charges. Jones, however, sued the magistrate, claiming
that he had illegally issued the search warrant. Citing Entick v. Carrington, Jones complained that the magistrate issued the warrant without
an allegation that goods had actually been stolen, and he also complained that the warrant did not specify the goods that were the object
of the search. 142 The court, however, concluded that the magistrate
had sufficient information to issue the warrant. One of the judges explained that a search warrant is valid when "the fair intent to be collected from the information is that the party has reasonable grounds
to suspect that the goods have been feloniously dealt with." 143
who arrested the plaintiff and the one who took him to the guard house) prevailed even though
no felony actually had been committed. The court indicated that a constable, unlike a private
person, could arrest on reasonable cause to believe a felony had been committed. This is consistent with Hale's view but not consistent with the contemporary view expressed by Professor
LaFave. See supra notes 70 & IOI.
American police face the recurring question of how to respond to suspicious situations, and
American courts are not always as generous as their English counterparts have been. In Campbell v. United States, 273 A.2d 252 (D.C. 1971), for example, police approached two men, one
carrying a television, the other a screwdriver. As the police approached, the man holding the
screwdriver dropped it. When the officer handed the screwdriver back to the man, he denied
that it was his. In response to questioning, the other man indicated that he had just purchased
the television from his cousin, who had dropped the men off about a block away. The officers
then took the men to the station for further investigation, and shortly thereafter they received
a report of a housebreaking at an address only twenty-five feet from where they had confronted
the men. Id. at 253. In reversing the defendants' conviction, the court held that the arrest, which
occurred before the housebreaking report, was not based on probable cause. The court explained
that the police did not know a crime had been committed, and the responses concerning the
screwdriver and cousin were "at most suspicious." Id. at 254-55.
140. [1897] I Q.B. 374 (C.A.).
141. The application for the search warrant was based on this sworn information:
Wood ... on oath maketh complaint that he hath just and reasonable cause to suspect
. . . that . . . Jones . . . has in his possession certain property belonging to . . .
Wood, and . . . that . . . Jones has been in his employ for five years a:id 1s now
under notice to quit, and that he has requested . . . Jones to allow him to search
several boxes which . . . Jones has had packed ready to be taken away, but which
he refuses to be looked through.
Id. at 375.
142. Id. at 376.
143. Jones v. German, 18 Cox Mag. Cas. 12, 13 (C.A. 1897) (unofficial report). The Law
Report has slightly different language. See [1897] 1 Q.B. at 377.
The case of Elsee v. Smith, I Dow. & Ry. 97 (K.B. 1822), is also informative. Smith sued
Elsee for falsely and maliciously causing a magistrate to issue a warrant. Elsee defended by argu-
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Three hundred years after Hale, English judges still use such terms
as "reasonable suspicion," "reasonable and probable cause," and
"reasonable and probable cause for suspicion" interchangeably. 144
Although English courts have not defined 'these terms precisely, the
cases demonstrate beyond cavil that the terms have never been used
to connote anything close to a more probable than not requirement.
Indeed, in a recent opinion, Lord Devlin categorically rejected a prima
facie standard and reiterated the appropriate test as one of reasonable
suspicion, the test the common law has always used. 145 Suspicion, Devlin
added, is "a state of conjecture or surmise when proof is lacking." 146
Emphasizing the contrast between reasonable suspicion and a prima
facie case, Devlin stated further that "suspicion arises at or near the
starting point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie
proof is the end." 141 This view, of course, is consistent not only with
Hale but also with the thirteenth-century statutes that authorized the
arrest of suspicious persons. 148 Throughout English history, the requirement of "probable cause of suspicion" 149 has meant only that the police
must have a reasonable basis for concluding that further investigation
of the individual is warranted. The English standard has always reflected
a belief that the individual's interest in security and privacy must defer
to the publk good when reasonable suspicion has been aroused.

B.

The American Approach

Evidence exists that the first Congress, which proposed the Bill of
Rights as amendments to the Constitution, shared the common law
view that probable cause required only a focused suspicion. In 1789,
for example, just a couple of months before the congressional resolution proposing the Bill of Rights, Congress passed a statute that permitted officials "to enter [and search] any ship or vessel, in which
they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares, or merchandise
ing that the magistrate was at fault for issuing the warrant, for Elsee had alleged only that he
had reason to suspect that certain trees had been stolen from the King's forest and that these
trees were in plaintiff's possession. Elsee maintained that the magistrate should not have acted
without a "perfect allegation that the offence had been committed." Id. at 102. The court disagreed,
unanimously holding that a magistrate may lawfully issue a search warrant on suspicion that
property has been stolen. A different rule, one judge wrote, would create a risk that felonies
would go undetected. Id. at 103. See also supra notes 70 & 101 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., McArdle v. Egan, 150 L.T.R. 412, 414 (C.A. 1933) (using all these terms).
The court also spoke of "good probable and reasonable cause for suspicion." Id. at 414.
145. Hussien v. Chong Fook Kam, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1626, 1630 (P.C.) (describing "reasonable
suspicion" as the test the common law has employed for many years).
146. Id. at 1630.
147. Id. Devlin added that this does not mean the police will always arrest when reasonable
suspicion exists; rather, it means they have discretion.
148. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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subject to duty shall be concealed." 1 so The same statute required a
search warrant for the entry and search of houses and other buildings,
but it permitted officials to obtain- a warrant when they had "cause
to suspect" that such goods would be found. 151 Moreover, Congress
used identical terminology in similar statutes passed in 1790, after the
Bill of Rights had been submitted to the states, and in 1799, after the
fourth amendment had been adopted. 152 Congress apparently saw no
difference between the probable cause requirement in the fourth amendment and the "reason to suspect" and "cause to suspect" standards
employed in these statutes.
Just as significantly, the first Congress in 1791, in a statute imposing duties on imported and domestic distilled spirits, authorized judges
upon "reasonable cause of suspicion" to issue search warrants for
fraudulently concealed spirits. 153 These warrants allowed government
officials to ''enter into all and every such place or places in which any of
the said spirits shall be suspected to be so fraudulently deposited .... '' 1 54
The fourth amendment, which permits warrants to issue only upon
"probable cause," became effective the same year as this statute. 1 ss
This further supports the view that the first Congress saw no inconsistency between the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement
and the common law's requirement of reasonable suspicion.
The Supreme Court's first probable cause decisions dealt with
forfeiture claims and malicious prosecution suits, not with searches
and seizures under the fourth amendment. Nevertheless, these cases
are appropriate to consider because no reason exists to believe that
the Court would have approached the constitutional concept any differently. The forfeiture provisions in the 1789 statute, the same statute
that permitted searches based on "reason to suspect," 1 56 required the
plaintiff claiming the seized goods or suing for damages to carry the
burden of proof; 1 57 officials who wrongfully seized goods were immune from damage actions as long as "there was a reasonable cause
of seizure." 1 58 The 1799 statute, which continued to use the earlier
standard for searches, 1 59 again placed the burden of proof on such
plaintiffs, but only after the government showed "probable cause"
150. Act of July 31, 1789, § 24, I Stat. 29, 43 (emphasis added). Congress passed a resolution submitting the Bill of Rights to the states in September, I 789. See I Stat. 97 (1789).
151. Act of July 31, 1789, § 24, I Stat. 29, 43.
152. Act of March 2, I 799, § 68, I Stat. 627, 677-78; Act of August 4, 1790, § 48, I Stat.
145, 170.
153. Act of March 3, 1791, § 32, I Stat. 199, 207.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. "[A]nd no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... " U.S. CONST. amend JV.
156. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
157. Act of July 3 I, I 789, § 27, I Stat. 29, 43-44.
158. Id. § 36 at 47-48.
159. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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for its action. 160 Thus, it appears that Congress used these various terms
interchangeably, but more importantly, as indicated below, this is how
the Court understood them. Likewise, the malicious prosecution cases
are relevant because the probable cause neeqed to justify a prosecution was arguably greater, and certainly not less, than that required
to support a search and seizure.
In Locke v. United States, 161 a claimant of seized goods maintained
that the probable cause requirement in the 1799 statute meant that the
government had to prove a prima facie case of forfeiture. Chief Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court, disagreed:
It may be added, that the term "probable cause," according
to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would
justify condemnation; and in all cases of seizure, has a fixed
and well-known meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. In this, its legal sense,
the Court must understand the term to have been used by
Congress. 162
Marshall did not cite any authority for this "accepted" meaning of
probable cause, but it clearly comports with what we have seen was
the common law meaning of the term. 163
In Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 164 a malicious prosecution case, the defendants obtained a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest after alleging that
he had stolen four horses. The plaintiff brought suit after the court
acquitted him of the charge on evidence showing that he lawfully owned
the horses. 165 The Court indicated that the plaintiff had the burden
of demonstrating lack of probable cause. The Court added that probable cause existed if the defendants had "reasonable grounds for believing" the plaintiff guilty of the crime. 166 The Court upheld the trial
judge's instruction that probable cause "was the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
160. Act of March 2, 1799, § 71, I Stat. 627, 678. A somewhat similar provision in the
same statute, however, immunized defendants from damages when there was "a reasonable cause
of seizure." Id. § 89, at 696.
161. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
162. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
163. Nineteenth century state arrest cases used similar terminology. See, e.g., Johnson v. State,
30 Ga. 426, 430-31 (1860); Eanes v. State, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 53, 55 (1845); Russell v. Shuster,
8 Watts & Serg. 308, 309 (Pa. 1844). But see Findlay v. Pruitt, 9 Port. 195, 200 (Ala. 1839)
(arrest cannot be based upon "mere suspicion"; arrest requires "well grounded belief, founded
on pregnant circumstances").
164. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 544 (1861).
165. Id. at 546-47.
166. Id. at 550.
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person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." 167
In Stacey v. Emery, 168 another forfeiture case, the Court indicated
that the terms reasonable cause and probable cause could be used
interchangeably:
The authorities we have cited speak of "probable" cause. The
Statute of 1799, however, uses the words "reasonable cause
of seizure." No argument is made that there is a substantial
difference in the meaning of these expressions, and we think
there is none. If there was a probable cause of seizure, there
was a reasonable cause. If there was a reasonable cause of
seizure, there was a probable cause. In many of these reported
cases the two expressions are used as meaning the same thing. 169
The Court also indicated in another section of the opinion that probable cause meant only a "reasonable ground of suspicion." 110
Although Carroll v. United States 111 is best known for establishing
the so-called automobile exception to the warrant requirement, 112 the
case is also significant because of what it reveals about the Court's
view early in this century of the fourth amendment's probable cause
requirement. On September 29, 1921, federal undercover agents attempted to purchase whiskey from the defendants in Grand Rapids,
Michigan. The defendants left the meeting place to obtain the whiskey,
but they never returned. On October 6, the same agents observed the
defend ants in the same car on a highway between Grand Rapids and
Detroit, but they were unsuccessful in attempting to follow them to
167. Id. at 551-52. See also Brown v. Selfridge, 224 U.S. 189 (1912). Compare the English
cases discussed supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
168. 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
169. Id. at 646. Some of the confusion noted by the Court regarding appropriate terminology
stemmed from different wording in two sections of the statute that appeared to cover the same
point. Compare Act of March 2, 1799, § 71, I Stat. 627, 678 (burden of proof shall lie on
claimant "only where probable cause is shown for such prosecution") with id. § 89 at 696 (claimant cannot recover damages if "there was a reasonable cause of seizure"). See also supra note
160. The Court in Stacey focused on § 89 of the statute.
170. 97 U.S. at 645 (quoting Munns v. Dupont, 17 F. Cas. 993 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No.
9,926)). The full statement is that probable cause is a "reasonable ground of suspicion, supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that
the party is guilty of the offense with which he is charged."
Dicta in the The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 374 (1824), suggested that probable cause
did require some focused suspicion. While taking judicial notice of the fact that the ship in
question was seized from waters notorious for smuggling, the Court, through Justice Story, said
that the question of probable cause "must be decided by the evidence in this record, and not
by mere general suspicions drawn from other sources." No such evidence was presented.
171. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
172. For criticism of this exception to the warrant requirement and of Carrolfs reasoning,
see Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requiremeni, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
603, 638-46 (1982).
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Detroit. On December 15, the agents again saw the defendants in the
same car on the same highway, this time travelling toward Grand
Rapids. The agents stopped the car, searched it, and discovered contraband liquor. 173 The Court found probable cause, noting that the
defend ants were the same persons who had previously offered to furnish the officers whiskey, that they were together in the same
automobile, and that they were coming from Canada, a known source
of illegal alcohol. 1 74
One can, of course, criticize Carroll's finding of probable cause. 175
Unlike the English cases examined above, which involved either an
accusation from a third party or some suspicious behavior by the person arrested, Carroll found probable cause even though the defendants
had done nothing immediately before the search to warrant suspicion
that they were then carrying contraband whiskey. The officers could
not even have known whether the defendants were coming from Detroit,
for they did not expect to observe them on the highway. 116 Concededly, the defend ants had agreed to purchase whiskey for the agents two
months earlier, but they had not delivered. Moreover, as the dissent
recognized, this one event could not have justified a search every time
the officers observed the defendants on the highway. 111 It seems doubtful, therefore, that the common law reasonable suspicion standard
justified the officers' conduct. 118 The point, however, is not that Carroll was correctly decided on its facts but that the Court viewed probable cause as a less demanding concept than it is often viewed today.
To this limited extent, Carroll accurately reflected the common law's
conception of probable cause.
A similar conception of probable cause is evident in the result, if
not in the language, of Brinegar v. United States. 119 This case is
especially significant because it contains the Court's most frequently
quoted statement on the meaning of probable cause. 180 Two federal
173. 267 U.S. at 134-36, 160. See also id. at 171-74 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
174. The partners in the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids were together
in the same automobile they had been in the night when they tried to furnish the whisky
to the officers, which was thus identified as part of the firm equipment. They were
coming from the direction of the great source of supply for their stock to Grand Rapids
where they plied their trade. That the officers, when they saw the defendants, believed
that they were carrying liquor, we can have no doubt, and we think it is equally clear
that they had reasonable cause for thinking so.
267 U.S. at 160.
175. See Black, A Critique of the Carroll Case, 29 CoLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1087-89 (1929).
176. The distance between Detroit and Grand Rapids is over 150 miles. After unexpectedly
confronting the defendants on the highway, the officers stopped them only 16 miles outside of
Grand Rapids. 267 U.S. at 134, 160.
177. Id. at I 74 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
178. See also supra note 170.
179. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
180. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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officers from the Alcohol Tax Unit observed the defendant in Oklahoma
driving a car that appeared to be "weighted with something." 181 The
defendant was driving in a westerly direction, about five miles west
of the state line, on a highway that led from Joplin, Missouri, toward
the defendant's home in Oklahoma. Although the officers had not
observed the defendant cross the state line, their suspicions were aroused.
One officer had arrested the defendant five months earlier for illegally
transporting liquor. Moreover, on at least two occasions in the preceding
six months, the officer had also observed the defendant loading large
quantities of liquor into a vehicle in Joplin, perfectly legal conduct
as long as the liquor was not brought into Oklahoma, a dry state.
Beyond this, the officers claimed that Joplin was a "ready source"
of liquor and that the defendant had a reputation as a liquor hauler. 182
Finally, although the Court put this fact aside, the defendant accelerated
his speed when he observed the officers on the highway. 183
In finding probable cause, the Brinegar Court cited not only Carroll
but also Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Locke v. United States. 184
In a slight but potentially significant shift in emphasis, however, the
Court observed that probable cause since Marshall's time had come
to mean more than bare suspicion. 185 Although the Court did not cite
the case or cases that had modified Marshall's definition, 186 it insisted
that a line must be drawn "between mere suspicion and probable
cause." 181 Nevertheless, both the Court's reaffirmation of Carro/1 188
and its finding of probable cause on such scant facts make plain that
its conception of probable cause did not approach a more probable
than not standard. Indeed, although the Court used the term "probability" to indicate something more than "mere suspicion," 189 it still
observed that "room must be allowed for some mistakes" in view of
the many ambiguous situations that confront the police. 190
I do not mean to suggest that the Court has never viewed probable
cause as a more demanding concept. On the contrary, the Court sug18 I. Id. at 163.
182. Id. at 162-68.
183. Id. at 166 n.7. For information concerning the current significance of flight at the appearance of the police, see I W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 3.6(e) at 669-71.
184. 338 U.S. at 175. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
185. 338 U.S. at 175.
186. The Court did cite cases that discussed probable cause, see id. at 176 n.15, but these
cases did not suggest a departure from Chief Justice Marshall's definition. Indeed, the Court
cited Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878), a case, as already discussed, that adhered to the
common law meaning of probable cause. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
187. 338 U.S. at 176.
188. The Court described Carroll as a close case, but one which it could not conclude had
been decided incorrectly. 338 U.S. at 177-78. Given Carroll, the Court concluded that probable
cause had to be found on the facts before it. Id. at 164-71, 178.
189. Id. at 176.
190. Id.
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gested in Johnson v. United States, 191 just one year before Brinegar,
that probable cause required the police to narrow their s1:1spicions to
one particular individual. In Johnson, several officers knocked at a
hotel room after obtaining probable cause that opium was being smoked
there. When the defendant answered the door, the officers stepped inside. When the defendant denied using opium, the officers arrested
her and searched her room, thereby finding incriminating evidence. 192
The Court first held that the warrantless search was impermissible,
no exigency being present to dispense with the warrant requirement. 193
The government argued, however, that the search of the room was
nevertheless valid incident to the defendant's arrest. In response to this
argument, the Court read the government's brief as conceding that
probable cause did not exist until the agents had entered the room
and ascertained that the defendant was the sole occupant. 194 The Court
then reiterated that the warrantless entry was impermissible. 195
Much can be said in defense of the Court's conclusion that the unconsensual, warrantless entry into the room violated the fourth
amendment. 196 The Court's probable cause discus_sion, however, unfortunately was influenced by the warrant issue. Its suggestion that
probable cause to arrest did not exist until the officers learned that
the defendant was the sole occupant was inconsistent not only with
hundreds of years of common law precedent but also with the views
the Court itself had expressed about probable cause since the eighteenth century. 197 Not surprisingly, the Court cited nothing but the
191. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Johnson was decided just one year before Brinegar, but it was not
included in Brinegar's citation of cases that had purportedly elevated the original meaning of
probable cause. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
192. 333 U.S. at 12.
193. Id. at 13-15.
194. Id. at 16.
195. Id. at 16-17.
196. For a defense of a strict warrant requirement, see Grano, supra note 172.
197. But see the Court's even stronger statement discussed supra note 83.
In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, IOI (1959), the Court indicated that Johnson represented
the "high water" mark of the principle that probable cause requires more than "common rumor
or report, suspicion, or even 'strong suspicion.' " The Court also said that the early American
cases supported this view. The court cited four cases, none of which supported its position.
Id. at IOI nn.3-5. In Frisbie v. Butler, Kirby 213 (Conn. Super. 1787), a magistrate issued
a general warrant to search all places and arrest all persons suspected by the complainant. The
defendant was arrested under this warrant, convicted of stealing pork, and fined. The appellate
court reversed the conviction because the complaint ''on which the arraignment and conviction
was had, contained no direct charge of the theft, but only an averment that the defendant was
suspected to be guilty." Id. at 215 (emphasis added). The court also indicated that it was not
even clear that the defendant was suspected of theft instead of mere trespass, "and his being
found guilty of the matter alleged against him in the complaint, could be no ground for sentencing and punishing him as for theft." Id. Finally, the court also observed, consistently with the
common law, that general warrants were impermissible. Id. In short, the case has no holding
concerning the required level of suspicion to support an arrest or search.
In Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38 (Pa. 1810), a judge relied on common rumor and
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government's purported concession to support this stringent view of
probable cause.
Of course, the question remains,. especially for those who would
charge the Court with the task of keeping the Constitution current with
the times, 198 of whether the Johnson view of probable cause is not
the better one. I explore this question in the next section.

III.

PROBABLE CAUSE FROM A POLICY PERSPECTIVE

A.

The Unreasonableness of the More
Probable Than Not Standard

The American Law lnstitute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure authorizes an arrest when an officer has "reasonable cause to
believe" that a person has committed a crime. 199 Similarly, the Code
permits a judge to issue a search warrant when there exists "reasonable
cause to believe'' that evidence of crime will be found. 200 As the commentary to the Code's arrest section explained, the drafters deliberately rejected the term "probable cause" because they did not want to
be misunderstood as suggesting that guilt must be more probable than
not before an arrest can be made. 201 While the commentary conceded
that a more probable than not standard would further assure innocent
people against interferences with their liberty, it maintained ''that society
would and should be unwilling to pay the price in less efficient crime
prevention and prosecution which this assurance would entail." 202
To illustrate its point, the commentary borrowed a hypothetical from
report to issue, on his own initiative, an arrest warrant. A constable who refused to enforce
the warrant was indicted and convicted. On appeal, the constable conceded that common rumor
could give probability to a charge preferred upon oath, but he maintained that this warrant
was defective because the judge had received no sworn testimony. Id. at 40. The court held
the warrant defective because probable cause was not established by oath. Id. at 42-43.
Finally, Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 39 (1814), held only that a general warrant to search
all suspected places and to search and arrest all suspected persons was void, while Commonwealth
v. Dana, 43 Mass (2 Met.) 329 (1841), held, despite arguments based on Entick v. Carrington,
that a search warrant for lottery tickets had been properly issued. Thus, none of these cases
supports the argument that probable cause has historically required more than a well-grounded
suspicion. Compare the cases cited supra note 163.
198. I have considerable difficulty with such a view of the Court's authority under our con-.
stitution: See Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28
WAYNE L. REV. I (1981); Grano, Ely's Theory of Judicial Review: Preserving the Significance
of the Political Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 167 (1981). Nevertheless, I think it important with
respect to the probable cause issue to demonstrate that policy arguments yield the same conclusions as historical arguments.
199. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 120.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
200. Id. §§ 210.1(7), 220.1(5).
201. Id. § 120 commentary at 292-96. See also id. § 210 commentary at 499-501 (rejecting
the more probable than not standard for searches).
202. Id. § 120 commentary at 294.
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the Restatement of Torts. 203 In the hypothetical, A confronts B and
C standing over a body, each accusing the other of murder. According
to the Restatement, A lawfully can arrest either B or C or both, even
though he cannot conclude it more probable than not that one rather
than the other committed the crime. Agreeing with the Restatement,
the commentary explained that the legality of multiple arrests for a
single offense will not be determined under the Code "in terms of the
apparent mathematical precision of the 'more probable than not' test,
but, rather, the substantiality of the basis for each arrest [will] be considered independently.'' 204
The result comports with common sense, but the Restatement
hypothetical is too easy. Imagine, instead, that the police suspect ten
persons of a crime but have no way of discriminating among them.
Suppose, moreover, that the police are certain, at least as certain as
humanly possible, that one of the ten committed the crime. With the
available evidence pointing equally to each suspect, the mathematical
probability that any one suspect committed the crime is only ten percent. Indeed, for any suspect selected at random from the group, the
odds are only ten percent that he is guilty but a whopping ninety percent that he is innocent. Such a probability analysis, however, distorts
our perspective. It causes us to overlook the success of the police in
narrowing their investigation from the universe of all possible suspects,
which may include much of the population, to ten individuals. In a
modern, mobile society, this should be seen as a rather significant
accomplishment. 205
Assume now that arresting each suspect would permit further investigation such as interrogation, a face or voice lineup, sampling blood
or hair, or taking fingerprints. 206 Or assume that the nature of the
203. Id. § 120 commentary at 295 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 119, illustration 2 (1965)).
204. Id. at § 120 commentary at 296.
.
205. But cf Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), where police investigation of
a rape focused on the defendant and his two nephews. The three lived in the apartment building
where the rape occurred, and they each had features generally resembling those of the rapist.
Moreover, the defendant and one of his nephews disappeared shortly after the crime. The police
arrested all three, and subsequent interrogation produced a confession from the defendant. The
Supreme Court suppressed the confession because the police interrogated the defendant instead
of promptly arraigning him, but its opinion suggested that the police should know whom to
charge before they arrest. See supra note 83. It has been argued, however, that the Supreme
Court did not suggest that the arrest of Mallory was illegal. See MODEL CODE, supra note 199,.
at § 120 commentary at 295 n.14.
206. For present purposes, it is not important that full probable cause may not be required
to justify stationhouse detention for some of these procedures. Cf Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969) (dictum that stationhouse detention for fingerprints may not require traditional probable cause). Under current law, some of these procedures clearly do require traditional probable cause. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (stationhouse detention for interrogation).
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crime suggests that searching the actual offender's house or car will
yield incriminating evidence. The question is whether we may reasonably
expect - indeed, require - each suspect to sacrifice some liberty or
privacy in order to unmask the offender. I think we can. In constitutional language, I would say that probable cause exists to arrest or
search each suspect.
Probable cause determinations balance individual interests against
community interests and decide which must yield to the other. The
difficulty with the more probable than not standard, and this is unfortunately true of many constitutional doctrines, 201 is that it excessively
exalts the individual. By doing so, it absolves the indiv_idual of any
responsibility for the cooperative community enterprise. Because the
more probable than not standard protects the individual virtually until
society is prepared to charge him with crime, it flouts the argument
that the community may legitimately demand some individual sacrifice
in its law enforcement efforts. Its banner •instead proclaims that to
leave crime unsolved is better than to demand such sacrifice. Even in
a society traditionally and properly dedicated to individual rights, such
an exaltation of individual interests demands justification.
Legal scholars have constructed various "models" to describe the
criminal justice system. These models, often couched in loaded terms,
include the due process model, the crime control model, and even the
family model. 208 All these constructs may be artificial and perhaps even
superficial, but to the extent they serve a purpose, I am suggesting
the need for a community model. In thinking about the criminal justice
system, we need a renewed commitment to the common law view that
the individual cannot live in isolation, oblivious to the community's
needs. One who shares the benefits of community living may legitimately
be expected to make reasonable sacrifices on behalf of the community's efforts to solve and control crime. Such a perspective should inform our analysis of probable cause.
This notion of individual responsibility and obligation makes the arrests or searches in the above hypothetical reasonable. Having narrowed the universe of possible suspects to ten, the community would
not be unreasonable in requiring all ten, nine of whom are presumably
innocent, to sacrifice some liberty or privacy to solve the crime. Of

207. · Citations here would only be provocative.
208. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) (constructing the due
process and crime control models); Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model"
of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970) (constructing the family model). Models die
hard. See, e.g., Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Wallen and Burger
Court's Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983) (resurrecting the due process model to
criticize the "Burger Court's" criminal procedure jurisprudence).
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course, in a concrete case we might want to know more facts, such
as whether alternative investigative techniques are available, 209 but here
it suffices to stress, as a general principle, that demanding some individual sacrifice from those suspected of crime is perfectly reasonable.
One may raise slippery slope objections to this argument. What if
the police suspect twenty, a hundred, or even a thousand persons? Where
do we stop if we do not base probable cause on a more probable than
not standard? Obviously, we must stop somewhere, but we need not
determine precisely where. Because we cannot quantify the concept of
reasonableness, 210 we necessarily can only engage in a commonsense
appraisal of the reasonableness of the police activity in question. In
the Model Code's words, the basis for each arrest or search must "be
consjdered independently.'' 21 1
A more substantial objection to my argument may be that if we
permit police to arrest or search the ten individuals in the hypothetical,
we must also permit them to arrest or search any ten people if they
can demonstrate a ten percent likelihood of success. Thus, we would
have to permit random searches if the police could demonstrate that
approximately one out of ten people on city streets unlawfully possesses
a concealed weapon or narcotics. This objection lacks merit because
its analogy is flawed. Although the probabilities .in the original
hypothetical and the objection's hypothetical are the same, the situations are distinguishable. In the original hypothetical, the police
developed cause to suspect ten specific individuals, and only those ten
were asked to sacrifice on the community's behalf. In contrast, this
new hypothetical exacts a price from individuals not specifically
suspected of wrongdoing. This latter situation conflicts with the fourth
amendment's core concern, for above all the framers demanded protection against general warrants and the fishing expeditions that such
warrants permitted. 212 Under the fourth amendment, it is one thing
to demand some sacrifice of liberty or privacy· when suspicion has
focused on an individual; it is another to demand such sacrifice when
no cause whatsoever exists to believe that the individual, as opposed
to anyone else, is involved with crime.
The stronger moral claim for sacrifice when suspicion has attached
209. See infra notes 223-51 and accompanying text.
210. The rejection of any mathematical approach to probable cause is perhaps even more
important than rejection of a particular standard. The Model Code's commentary argues that "in
the final analysis it is the inappropriateness of testing concrete cases, with their multiple and
particular characteristics, against any standard couched in terms of mathematically precise degrees
of probability, that has led the Reporters to speak of reasonable cause." MODEL CooE, supra
note 199, at § 120 commentary at 296.
211. Id.
212. See generally T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24-38 (1969);
Grano, supra note 172, at 617.
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to the individual only partly explains this distinction. 213 Also of concern in the second hypothetical is the exposure of nearly everyone in
society, not just a few individuals, to arrest or search. For most people
the potentially greater magnitude of the intrusion would outweigh the
government's interest in solving crime. Moreover, because arresting or
searching everyone is impractical, the danger of arbitrary selection is
apparent. The Supreme Court has stated more than once that control
of arbitrary discretion is a fundamental fourth amendment concern. 214
The common law cases discussed in the previous section understood
this distinction. 2 1 s Those cases did not approve of arbitrary arrests or
searches; on the contrary, the eighteenth-century cases denounced the
general warrants that gave officials unfettered discretion to arrest or
search. 216 The common law may not have required much suspicion,
but it did require some cause to believe that the particular individual
had been involved in crime. Even the thirteenth century nightwalker
statutes reflected a belief that travelling after dusk raised a suspicion
of felony, 211 a belief that, although unreasonable today, may have been
reasonable then. In assessing either suspicious conduct or a third party's
report, the common law required suspicion to point to a specific individual before allowing an arrest or search to be made.
In many cases, of course, the police do not have several suspects.
Instead the evidence they have points to a particular individual. 218 Even
213. In another context, I have argued that no moral impediment exists when the police seek
to interrogate a person whom they have arrested on probable cause. Grano, Voluntariness, Free
Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 901-02, 909-19 (1979).
214. Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (fixed checkpoint stops
near the border permissible; such checkpoints leave little room for arbitrary discretion) with United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (I 975) (roving patrol stops near the border impermissible
absent reasonable suspicion). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random traffic
stops impermissible absent reasonable suspicion; dictum suggests that fixed roadblock stops for
traffic inspections would be different).
215. See supra notes 80-149 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
218. People v. Marshall, 69 Mich. App. 288,244 N.W.2d 451 (1976) provides an illustration
of this type of situation. The police discovered three bodies in a home, all stabbed to death
by someone apparently left handed. Because there were no signs of forced entry, the police theorized
that the killer had access to the home. Investigators also found strands of hair not belonging
to the victims and traces of sperm over two of the bodies. Suspicion focused on the defendant,
who was the s9n of one victim and the stepson of another. The defendant was left handed,
he presumably had access to the house, he had a history of assaultive conduct, he had hair
similar to that found at the crime scene, and he had been having loud arguments with his father.
In addition, anonymous callers had suggested that he was the killer. On these facts, the police
sought to bring the defendant to the station in order to take hair and blood samples, the latter
because blood type can be ascertained from sperm.
The prosecutor, believing that probable cause did not exist, obtained a temporary detention
order authorizing the desired samples to be taken. On appeal, the court avoided deciding whether
such detentions are permissible absent traditional probable cause; it held instead that traditional
probable cause was present. Id. at 299-302, 244 N. W.2d at 458.
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in these cases, the question is whether we should attempt to quantify the probability of the defendant's guilt, as the more probable than
not standard suggests, or whether we should simply engage in a commonsense balancing of the interests. Under a balancing approach, of
course, the strength of the suspicion would remain an important factor to consider.
The previous discussion suggests that the balancing analysis is more
appropriate. We slight the community's interests by insisting that the
individual must be protected against intrusion until the.police are convinced that he more likely than not is the offender. When, for example, the reasonably cautious person believes that the available evidence
points to a particular suspect, when investigative alternatives have been
exhausted or appear prohibitive, and when an arrest or search may
provide additional evidence to help solve the crime, the community's
demand for individual sacrifice may be reasonable. Of course, the
sacrifice may be unpleasant, especially if the individual is exonerated,
but in evaluating the reasonableness of the police conduct, we should
not ignore the individual's obligation to the community's cooperative
enterprise.
Finally, situations exist in which the police are not sure that a crime
has occurred. In Gates, for example, the police could not be sure that
any crime had been or was being committed. While more caution may
be appropriate in such cases, the basic analysis should remain the
same. 219 Suppose, for example, that an informant in a large city reports
that Jones has committed murder and has placed the unnamed victim's body in the trunk of his car. Suppose, further, that the police
are not sure whether a murder has occurred, a realistic assumption
especially in urban areas with large populations, countless missing persons, and numerous transients. On the face of it, the uncertainty regarding whether a murder occurred does not distinguish this situation from
those previously discussed. It may be perfectly reasonable to require
Jones to open his trunk well before we can assert with confidence that a
dead body more probably than not will be found. This conclusion is
consistent with the common law approach that permitted arrests on
suspicion pursuant to the hue and cry even when the constable was
not sure that a felony had been committed. 220

219. But see W. LAFAVE, supra notes 70 & 101 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 101 & 139 and accompanying text. See also MODEL CODE, supra note
199, § 120 commentary at 296:
Since in many cases at the time of an arrest there will be some doubt as to both the
commission of the crime and the identity of the offender, and since these two probabilities are usually independent so that the probability as to a particular person's
guilt is the product of these two probabilities, there will be few cases which could
strictly measure up to a "more-probable-than-not" standard.
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The view of probable cause advocated in this section recognizes arrests
and searches as legitimate investigative tools, tools to be used not after
a crime has been solved but rather in the process of solving crime.
It agrees with Lord Devlin that "suspicion arises at or near the starting point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie
proof is the end. " 221 Most importantly, unlike the more probable than
not standard, it stresses the need to balance realistically the competing
interests of the individual and his community. In Lord Mansfield's
words, "[m]any an innocent man has been, and may be taken up upon
suspicion; but the mischief and inconvenience to the public in this point
of view are comparatively nothing. It is of great consequence to the
police of the country." 222

B.

The Ingredients of a Balancing Approach to Probable Cause

In rejecting a "multifactor balancing test of 'reasonable police
conduct,' " 223 the Supreme Court has suggested that the fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause itself reflects the appropriate
balance between the individual's and society's interests. 224 To a large
extent this is true, although, as we have seen, there has been a recent
tendency to skew the balance in the individual's favor. Properly
understood, most probable cause issues should involve only the question of whether the police had a well-grounded suspicion concerning
the target of their action. The common law cases certainly did not
engage in any elaborate balancing analysis before deciding whether an
arrest or a search was legal.
Nevertheless, three considerations suggest that a balancing analysis
cannot be altogether ignored. First, even under a relaxed reasonable
suspicion standard, some cases will be close, and in deciding close cases,
courts cannot help but balance the interests at stake. Second, by tying
probable cause to what the reasonably cautious person would do under
the circumstances, the Supreme Court has injected balancing into
the equation, 225 for the reasonably cautious person behaves by evaluating
the totality of circumstances and by balancing the competing interests.
Third, the reasonably cautious person will evaluate the same police conduct differently depending not only on the level of antecedent cause
but on the perceived need for that conduct.
Fourth amendment analysis offers two methods of balancing. First,
courts can establish an appropriate level of required cause by balanc221. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
222. The statement, made in Ledwith v. Catchpole, is reported in M'Cloughan v. Clayton
& Riding, Holt 478, 171 Eng. Rep. 311, 314 (K.B. 1816).
223. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979).
224. Id. at 208, 213-14.
225. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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ing the need for a particular investigative technique against the invasion the technique entails. When courts use this approach, they apply
the established level of required cause whenever the police employ the
particular technique. Thus, temporary street stops for interrogation
always require only "reasonable suspicion," 226 while stationhouse detentions for interrogation always require full, traditional "probable
cause. " 221 Second, courts can instead balance the interests by concentrating, as Professor Barrett once advocated, on the facts of each case. 228
Under this approach, the same investigative technique may require more
antecedent cause in one case than in another. 229
In Camara v. Municipal Court 230 the Supreme Court employed a
balancing analysis and held that the meaning of probable cause may
vary in different contexts. 231 Subsequently, although relying on Camara's
balancing analysis, the Court in Terry v. Ohio 232 nevertheless suggested
that street stops and frisks simply are not subject to the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement. 233 The ·Court explained that the
fourth amendment's warrant clause, which contains the probable cause
requirement, does not apply to rapidly unfolding street investigations. 234
In a perceptive criticism shortly after Terry, Professor LaFave observed
that it would have been more consistent with Camara for the Court
to have said that stops and frisks require a different kind of probable
cause. 235
Professor LaFave, however, rejected as unworkable Professor Barrett's suggestion that reasonableness must be determined on the facts

226. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975);_Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
227. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Cf. Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319
(1983) (airport detention moved beyond Terry stop and required full, traditional probable cause).
228. See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SuP.
CT. REV. 46, 63 (1960) (asking whether fourth amendment would "be better served by . . .
determin[ing) the reasonableness of [an intrusion) by balancing the seriousness of the suspected
crime and the degree of reasonable suspicion [the police possess) against the magnitude of the
invasion· of the [individual's] personal security and property rights").
229. See also W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 25 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment
does not, I submit, preclude us from weighing the extent of the detention against the strength
of the evidence that justifies it.").
230. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
231. The Court stated that "there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." Id. at 536-37.
The Court held that in the context of housing inspections by the Department of Health, probable
cause requires only that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
area inspection [be) satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling." Id. at 538.
232. 392 U.S. I (1968).
233. Id. at 20. For citations to Camara, see id. at 21, 27.
234. Id. at 20.
235. Lafave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond,
67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 53-56 (1968).
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of each case. 236 In LaFave's view, discrete levels of probable cause can
be defined for discrete investigative techniques. For street stops, he
maintained, probable cause requires a "substantial possibility" of guilt,
but for an arrest it requires that guilt be more probable than not. : 3 '
Thus, LaFave's view differed from the Court's more in characterization than in substance. Ironically both views contributed to the present misconception, so inconsistent with both the English common law
and early American views, that probable cause as traditionally defined
requires more than a well-focused suspicion. 238
The real difficulty, however, is that by positing a system with discrete
levels of antecedent cause, both the Court and Professor Lafave implicitly suggested that quantitative evaluations of fact situations are
feasible and desirable. 239 Moreover, their approach imposed on the
reasonably cautious person an unrealistic method of analysis. Reasonably
cautious persons, as stated above, do not simply measure facts against
some predetermined standard of measurement. Reasonably cautious
persons respond to factual complexities and nuances, not to rigid legal
rules. 240
In real life, the reasonably cautious person would consider several
factors in assessing the reasonableness of police conduct. 241 First, he
or she would want to know the strength of the government's interest.
As Justice Jackson once recognized, roadblock searches to save a kidnap victim are eminently more reasonable than roadblock searches to
uncover bootleg whiskey. 242 For purposes of judicial review, however,
care must be taken not to carry this point too far, lest it enable the
236. Id. at 56-57.
237. Id. at 57, 73-74. See also supra notes 70 & 101 and accompanying text. Professor Lafave
did concede, however, that the seriousness of the crime was a case-by-case variable that must
not be ignored. Id. at 57-58·.
238. Terry provoked widespread concern about the potential for abuse in permitting fourth
amendment activity to occur without traditional probable cause. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra
note 199, § I 10 commentary at 262-88. Ironically, however, by employing the common law standard for arrests as the required justification for temporary street detentions, Terry helped to
make the traditional requirement of probable cause more rigorous.
239. See ·supra note 210 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 119 comment j (1934) (maintaining that the "nature
of the crime committed, or feared, the chance of the [suspect escaping), the harm anticipated
if [the suspect escapes] and if he is arrested" should be considered in determinig whether an
arrest should be made). See also E. CAHN, CoNFRONT!NG INJUSTICE 11-12 (196:?) (describing a
reasoning process, "graded pragmatism," by which "beliefs must be ranked and graded according to the conceived cost that may follow from proceeding to act on them"); G. SAWYER, LAW
IN SOCIETY 12 (1965) (maintaining that legal activity exemplifies "the general human necessity
for getting on with the business in hand, being content with approximations, committing oneself
to a course of action with much less than complete assurance as to its soundness").
241. Much of the analysis that follows is suggested by State v. Hall, 93 N.J. 522, 461 A.2d
J 155 (authorizing stationhouse detentions on Jess than traditional-probable cause), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 526 (1983).
242. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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judiciary to nullify criminal laws it dislikes. Narcotics offenses, for
example, can be viewed as harmless nuisances or as offenses that are
eroding the fabric of society. To a large extent, the judiciary must
accept society's judgment, as reflected at least partly in its sentencing
laws, about the seriousness of certain offenses. 243 Nevertheless, Justice
Jackson's point cannot be ignored, for intuitively we agree that less
antecedent cause should be required as the need for the police conduct
becomes more urgent.
.
Evaluating the government's interest involves more than simply comparing kidnapping and bootlegging. When the desired information is
readily available through less intrusive means, the community's right
to demand individual sacrifice will seem less obvious. For example,
the reasonableness of a detention to determine blood type 244 may depend partly on whether the police can just as readily obtain the same
information from public records. 245 Similarly, one must consider the
likelihood that the intrusion will advance the investigation and ultimate
prosecution of the offender. Detaining a suspect to obtain a blood sample, for example, may be unreasonable if the desired information will
contribute little to the crime's solution or to proof of guilt at trial. 246
In assessing the government's interest, the need for immediate action can also be a relevant consideration. For instance, we should give
more deference to an officer who has had to make a prompt on-thescene judgment about the proper course of action. 247 Moreover, it comports .with common sense to recognize that less cause should be required when evidence may be lost than when the risk of loss is minimal.
Similarly, we do not expect an officer to be as cautious with a report
that a murder is in progress as with a report that marijuana plants
are being grown. It is not simply that murder is more serious than
growing marijuana but, more significantly, that delay or hesitancy with
regard to such a murder report could prove disastrous.
The nature of the intrusion is also relevant. Common sense and experience teach that some intrusions are more burdensome than others.
243. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (courts have limited authority in reviewing
state sentencing schemes under the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause).
But see Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) (suggesting a more active role for courts in this
regard).
244. See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 69 Mich. App. 288, 244 N. W .2d 451 (1976), discussed
supra note 218.
245. See MooEL CooE, supra note 199, § 170 commentary at 480 (discussing reasonableness
of detentions for nontestimonial identification purposes without traditional probable cause).
246. State v. Hall, 93 N.J. at 562, 566, 461 A.2d at 1160, 1162-63.
247. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 78 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring):
It was clear that the officer had to act quickly if he was going to act at all, and,
as stated above, it seems to me that where immediate action is obviously required,
a police officer is justified in acting on rather less objectively articulable evidence than
when there is more time for consideration of alternative courses of action.
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For example, although the case law requires "probable cause" to search
either a home or a car, we need no more than common sense to
recognize that a search of the former is far more intrusive than a search
of the latter. Other things being equal, we would therefore expect the
reasonably cautious person to demand more antecedent cause for a
house search than a. car search, a conclusion the Court in Brinegar
seemed to share. 248
In objection to this line of reasoning, it may be argued that fixed
standards are needed to provide the police concrete guidelines and
to permit the judiciary to engage in judicial review with more
confidence. 249 Although this objection has some force, and perhaps
its own appeal to common sense, it is not ultimately persuasive. The
fiction of discrete quantitative standards of antecedent cause has not
produced a body of consistent, easily understood case law, nor should
we expect it to. The reason, as I have tried to demonstrate, is that
the real life, commonsense judgments of reasonably cautious people
cannot be cabined by rigid, antecedent yardsticks. Indeed, I would
speculate that while the cases speak the language of categorical rules,
many probably reflect the balancing analysis outlined above. I would
not be surprised, for example, by an empirical study demonstrating
that courts assess probable cause less rigidly when a car rather than
a home is involved. 250
The need for clear rules, however, cannot be discounted altogether.
As I indicated at the outset, the balancing approach must be considered
against the historical background of probable cause as a relatively

248. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) ("No problem of searching the home
or any other place of privacy was presented either in Carroll or here."). Homes and cars are
treated differently for purposes of the warrant requirement, but the above statement was made
in the context of a probable cause discussion.
249. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219-20 (1979) (White, J., concurring) ("But
if courts and law enforcement officials are to have workable rules ... this balancing must in
large part be done on a categorical basis - not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual
police officers.").· See also United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2652 (1983) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (" I am concerned, however, with what appears to me to be an emerging tendency
on the part of the Court to convert the Terry decision into a general statement that the Fourth
Amendment requires only that any seizure be reasonable."). Professor Amsterdam voiced a similar
objection some years ago. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 393 (1974) (expressing fear that a sliding scale approach to probable cause would
convert the fourth amendment into an "immense Rorschach blot"). Amsterdam added,
Under that view, "[r]easonableness is in the first instance for the [trial court] . . .
to determine." What it means in practice is that appellate courts defer to trial courts
and trial courts defer to the police. What other results should we expect? If there
are no fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he may and may not do, courts
are seldom going to say that what he did was unreasonable.
Id. at 394.
250. Cf. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 7.2(d), at 530-34 (suggesting that the particularity
requirement is not rigorously enforced in automobile cases).
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undemanding concept. Historically, courts have required little suspicion to justify even the most serious intrusions on liberty and privacy.
Unless this is kept in mind, balancing may enable courts to hamper
law enforcement as severely as the more probable than not test can.
The balancing approach perhaps is most appropriate for the magistrate called upon to issue a warrant. Before the event, the magistrate
is in a good position to decide whether an arrest or search should be made
or whether other investigative techniques should be employed. Moreover,
the impartial magistrate may balance the interests more objectively than
a police officer. This provides a strong reason for enforcing a tough
warrant requirement, something the Court unfortunately has been loath
to do. 251 After the event, however, a properly applied balancing test
limits the scope of judicial intervention. The proper scope of judicial
review in probable cause cases is the topic of the next section.
C.

Probable Cause and Judicial Review

Dissenting in Spinelli v. United States, 252 Justice Black said,
[t]he existence of probable cause is a factual matter that calls
for the determination of a factual question. While no statistics
are immediately available, questions of probable cause to issue
search warrants and to make arrests are doubtless involved in
many thousands of cases in state courts. All of those probablecause state cases are now potentially reviewable by this Court.
It is, of course, physically impossible for this Court to review
the evidence in all or even a substantial percentage of those
cases. Consequently, whether desirable or not, we must inevitably accept most of the fact findings of the state courts,
particularly when, as here in a federal case, both the trial and
appellate courts have decided the facts the same way. 253
Until Illinois v. Gates, 254 I had always dismissed Justice Black's
remarks as hardly worthy of consideration. Regardless of the issue involved, the Court lacks sufficient resources to review even a fraction
of state and federal cases; yet, no one has seriously argued that the
Court should abdicate judicial review altogether. I also believed that
Justice Black mistakenly described probable cause as a "factual" rather
than a legal issue, and that appellate review of the legal issue of probable cause was as appropriate as appellate review of any other legal issue.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See
393
Id.
103

Grano, supra note 172.
U.S. 410 (1969).
at 433-34 (Black, J ., dissenting).
S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
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In Gates, however, the Court turned sharply in Justice Black's direction. The Court stated with new-found 255 seriousness that appellate
scrutiny of a magistrate's decision should not take the form of de novo
review. 256 It indicated that on appeal the only question should be whether
the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for finding probable cause. 257
Furthermore, the Court, in a footnote, made the provocative statement that because so many variables exist in the probable cause equation, "one determination will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for
another." 258 Professor Kamisar says that this last remark made him
''wince,'' for it immediately reminded him of the difficulties engendered
by the voluntariness doctrine that once governed the law of
confessions. 259
My original beliefs and Professor Kamisar's concerns notwithstanding, both Justice Black in Spinelli and the Court in Gates correctly
perceived the disutility of strict judicial review in this context. As we have
seen, probable cause under the Court's own formulation requires an
assessment of how the reasonably cautious person might respond to
the particular circumstances. 260 As this article has elaborated, in many
instances this assessment requires the decisionmaker to balance the competing interests. 261 Reasonably cautious people, however, frequently respond to the same facts differently. We know, for example, that on
the same evidence one jury may acquit while another may convict, but,
except in unusual cases, we are prepared to accept either response as
reasonable. On appeal of a jury verdict, the court does not ask whether
it would have found the defendant guilty but only whether a reasonable
jury could have found the defendant guilty. 262 Applying this principle
to the review of a finding of probable cause, the court should similarly ask only whether the reasonably cautious person could have concluded that probable cause was present. Otherwise, we would have to
explain why the standard of review for probable cause is stricter than
it is for jury verdicts.
255. The Court has said this before but generally has failed to act upon it. See, e.g., Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,419 (1969); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960).
256. 103 S. Ct. at 233 I.
251. Id. at 2331, 2336.
258. Id. at 2332 n.11.
259. Kamisar, supra note 3, at 571. Although Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
now dominates the law of confessions, the voluntariness doctrine still plays a role. See, e.g.,
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). See also Grano, supra note 213, at 864-65 n.33.
260. See-supra note 2 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 223-51 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (constitutional standard of review
is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt"). See also C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 789-90 (2d ed. 1972) (discussing the level of proof
required to survive a directed verdict motion).

508

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 17:3

Viewed from this perspective, the voluntariness confession cases that
Professor Kamisar invoked do not furnish an appropriate analogy.
Whatever voluntariness means, the voluntariness doctrine does not require courts to examine the likely response of a hypothetical ''reasonable
person. " 263 Instead, as Professor Kamisar has argued, the courts have
used the voluntariness test as a tool for approving some police practices and disapproving others. 264 Thus, the voluntariness doctrine has
generated almost a per se rule that police use of physical force will
render a confession inadmissible. 265 If Professor Kamisar has correctly
described the purpose of the voluntariness doctrine, its totality of circumstances test, which renders one case of limited precedential value
for another, is inadequate because it cannot clearly separate permissible and impermissible interrogation techniques. 266 The probable cause
inquiry, by way of contrast, does not attempt to identify certain police
practices as acceptable or unacceptable. Rather, the probable cause
inquiry is intended to ascertain only whether the reasonably cautious
person would have responded to the particular circumstances by making an arrest or search. We know that arrests and searches are permissible; the probable cause inquiry is designed to tell us only whether
the particular facts at hand warranted such police activity. Thus, while
we arguably may want "precedent" in the confessions context, the
nature of probable cause requires fact-specific judicial decisions that
consequently have limited precedential value.
The utility of labelling probable cause a "factual matter," as
Justice Black did, is not as clear. Taking this approach, a number of
federal courts have held that lower court findings of probable cause
must be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous. 267 While this approach generally comports with my analysis, it has the disadvantage
of raising questions about both the meaning of "clearly erroneous" 268 and
263. For an argument that this should be part of the inquiry, see Grano, supra note 213,
at 896-909.
264. Kamisar, What Is An "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on lnbau and Reid's
Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. :ns, 745-46 (1963). But see Grano,
supra note 213, at 923-24 (arguing that Kamisar's view assigns too broad a role to the judiciary).
265. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
266. For criticism of the voluntariness test on this ground, see Y. KAM1sAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 69-76 (1980). For an argument in defense of a somewhat modified
voluntariness test, see generally Grano, supra note 213.
267. See, e.g., United States v. Pepple, 707 F.2d 261,263 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Wentz, 686 F.2d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. O'Connor, 658 F.2d 688, 690-91
(9th Cir. 1981). But see United States v. One Twin Engine Beech Airplane, 533 F.2d 1106, I 108-09
(9th Cir. 1976).
268. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), the Court said,
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.
See also United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 1981).
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the difference between legal and factual issues. 269 Without attempting
to answer these questions, it should suffice to say that findings of probable cause must be accepted unless the reasonably cautious person
could have only concluded that probable cause was lacking.
If this approach is followed, appellate reversal of probable cause
determinations admittedly will be as infrequent as appellate reversal
of jury verdicts. This may appear to undermine, in Justice Brennan's
words, "the judiciary's role as the only effective guardian of Fourth
Amendment rights." 210 This objection, however, fails to discriminate
between those situations that appropriately demand strict judicial review
and those that do not. 27 ' For example, whether governmental activity
is a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment is a judicial
question, 272 and no reason exists for an appellate court to defer to
a government official's or a lower court's conclusion that certain activity is or is not a search. Similarly, courts must define the nature
and scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement. Appellate courts
should not defer on questions such as whether, as a matter of course,
entire houses can be searched incident to an occupant's arrest 273 or
whether a warrantless search of a footlocker in police custody is permissible absent exigent circumstances. 274 On issues such as these, an
appellate court may reverse a policeman's or a lower court's conclusions simply because it disagrees with them.
Accordingly, the definition of probable cause should properly remain
subject to plenary appellate review. The application of the probable
cause standard to particular fact situations, however, cannot profitably
be subject to plenary appellate review, because any test that refers to a
reasonable person's assessment of the facts inevitably leaves considerable
leeway for permissible differences of opinion. An appellate court should

269. In the federal habeas corpus context, where state court fact-finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness, the Court has had to struggle with the distinction between findings of pure
fact and mixed determinations of law and fact. It has not always done well. See, e.g., Sumner
v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
270. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct 2317, 2351 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
271. I once suggested that the distinction made in other areas of constitutional law between
strict scrutiny and mere rational basis review perhaps should be applied to fourth amendment
issues. See Grano, Supreme Court Review - Foreword: Perplexing Questions About Three Basic
Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 425, 449 n.219 (1978). The text here is an attempt
to put some flesh on that idea. I am suggesting that judicial review of probable cause determinations should employ a rational basis standard rather than a strict scrutiny standard.
272. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
273. See, e.g., Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977).
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not reverse a finding of probable cause merely because it disagrees with
the lower court's analysis of the facts. 275
. This argument, however, does not completely dispose of Justice Brennan's objection. As he stated in his Gates dissent, we premise much
of our fourth amendment law on the belief that a neutral and detached
magistrate, not a police officer, should decide whether privacy must
yield to the government's desire to arrest or search. 216 If this view is
correct - and I have argued elsewhere that it perfectly captures the
fourth amendment's underlying purpose 211 - then determining who
should decide whether an arrest or search will be made is more important than deciding the post-arrest or post-search question of whether
probable cause existed. The question of who decides whether probable
cause exists is especially apposite in light of Lord Devlin's point that
sufficient cause does not mandate that an arrest or search should occur,
but rather, it establishes discretion to engage in such activity. 278 A
rigorously enforced warrant requirement would require that a judicial
officer, whenever practicable, decide whether that discretion should
be exercised. It would have the magistrate, not the police officer, decide
whether privacy interests should yield to law enforcement interests or
whether the police should investigate further before such individual
sacrifice is demanded. Thus, Justice Brennan is correct in stressing the
importance of judicial review, but, under the fourth amendment, that
review is more appropriate, and m_ore meaningful, if it occurs before
the event.
Even under a rigorous warrant requirement, however, situations will
occur in which obtaining a warrant is impractical. Moreover, police
will continue to make warrantless searches and seizures as long as the
Court adheres to the view that warrantless felony arrests may be made
in public places without regard to exigent circumstances. 279 Thus, one
may argue that the previous paragraph does not fully answer Justice
Brennan's concern about limiting the role of judicial review. Unless
some form of strict judicial scrutiny occurs after the event, appellate
courts will not review the vast number of cases in which the police
proceed without a warrant.
Three alternative responses may be made to this objection. First,
as long as we permit some fourth amendment activity to occur without
a warrant, police will often be required to decide, in the first instance,
275. See supra note 74.
276. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2351 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
277. See Grano, supra note 172.
278. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
279. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). The Court in Watson relied partly on
an historical analysis, and its conclusion, whether we like it or not, may have been correct. See
2 M. HALE, supra note 89, at 85-104. My defense of a strong search warrant requirement is
based largely on a similar historical analysis. See Grano, supra note 172, at 613-21.
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whether the reasonably cautious person would arrest or search under
the circumstances. Moreover, if, as I have argued in this article, probable cause requires a reasonableness analysis that cannot be quantified, the scope of judicial review must necessarily be narrow. Were
we to permit plenary judicial reviw of the officer's judgment, we would
not be faithful to the reasonableness test. By its very nature, a
reasonableness test leaves considerable room for permissible differences
of opinion. 280 Such a test deems irrelevant the conclusion a reviewing
judge might have reached had he or she been on the street. The judge
should only decide whether the officer's conclusion is one that a
reasonable person could not have made.
Some may find this first response unacceptable, although objectors
shoµld bear the burden of explaining both the importance and profitability of judicial second-guessing. Nevertheless, if this response is
unacceptable, a second response would concede the need for plenary
review by the trial judge but deny such review to appellate cou~ts. That
is, the trial judge could be permitted to act, albeit after the event, as
an issuing magistrate. Thus, this approach would provide one level
of strict judicial scrutiny, just as occurs in warrant cases. 281 Once the
trial judge decided, however, appellate review would be just as limited
as it is in warrant cases. Although this approach has the disadvantage
of permitting police judgments to be second-guessed by trial level armchair philosophers, it at least has the advantage of reducing appellate
court involvement in cases that, once decided, can have only limited
precedential value.
A third response would simply permit judicial review to differ in
scope depending on whether the police obtained a warrant. Under this
approach, appellate courts would defer to a magistrate's decision to
issue a warrant, but every court, from the trial court to the Supreme
Court, would give plenary review to probable cause issues in cases not
involving a warrant. Arguably, this approach would have the virtue
of encouraging police to obtain warrants. 282 Nevertheless, I find this
approach the least desirable of the three. It is inconsistent, on the one
hand, to permit the police to act without a warrant but, on the other
hand, to impose a penalty on them for doing so. If we want the police
to obtain a warrant, we should directly require that they do so by closing
280. See supra text accompanying note 275.
281. One may question whether issuing magistrates engage in any kind of strict judicial scrutiny
before approving warrants. See L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME
119-20 (1967) (reporting some evidence that magistrates give more careful attention to requests
for search warrants than to requests for arrest warrants). Of course, if magistrates do not take
the warrant process seriously, the entire fourth amendment structure, which is built around the
warrant requirement, should be reconsidered.
282. CJ. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, 3.l(c) at 445-46 (indicating that judicial review may
be more deferential in warrant cases to encourage use of the warrant process).
In United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), decided after this article was written, the
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the loopholes that currently exist in fourth amendment warrant law. 283
We should not permit a lower court's finding of probable cause, "based
on the 'fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human
conduct,' " 284 to be reversed on appeal unless it exceeds the bounds
of reasonableness.
Regardless of the approach taken in cases without a warrant, the
appropriateness of limited appellate review when the police have obtained a warrant should be apparent. Accordingly, we should reject
Justice Stevens' dissent in Gates, which found probable cause lacking
even under the majority's totality of circumstances test, because it seems
to suggest de novo review of the magistrate's judgment. 285 The Brennan dissent, however, argued that the majority's abandonment of the
two-pronged test caused it to employ the wrong legal standard to
evaluate the facts. 286 This "legal" question is the subject of the final
section of this paper.
IV.

Gates

REVISITED -

PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE

HEARSAY REPORT

We at last can return to Oates's rejection of Spinelli's two-pronged
test for evaluating hearsay sources of probable cause. Gates, it will
be recalled, indicated that Spinelli's two prongs should be viewed as
relevant considerations in a totality of circumstances analysis rather
than as separate, independent requirements. 287 Moreover, the Gates
Court stated that strength in one prong can overcome a deficiency in
the other. 288 According to Professor LaFave, this assertion is not only

Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply when the police have reasonably
relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Although the Court stated that it was leaving the probable cause ·standard untouched, the holding in Leon obviously accomplishes by another
route what the Court tried to accomplish in Gates when it required appellate courts to give deference
to the magistrate's finding of probable cause. If the Court subsequently extends Leon to prob- .
able cause cases not involving search warrants, it will achieve through "remedy" analysis what
the text is advocating as a matter of substantive fourth amendment law.
283. See Grano, supra note 172.
284. Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 115 (9th Cir. 1962) (quoting Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960)).
285. See supra notes 53 & 56-67 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens criticized the majority
for rejecting, "in a fact-bound inquiry of this sort, the judgment of three levels of state courts."
103 S. Ct. at 2361 (Stevens & Brennan, JJ ., dissenting). His point was not well taken. First,
the majority rejected the legal standard that the lower courts had applied. Second, the lower
Illinois courts had reversed the magistrate's determination that probable cause existed. It was
within the permissable scope of judicial review for the Supreme Court to fault the lower courts
for not showing proper deference to the magistrate's findings. In effect, the Court reversed.the
Illinois courts for applying the wrong standard of judicial review.
286. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 23 & 33 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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"dead wrong" but also "totally inconsistent with the Court's prior
teachings." 289
Was the Court, as LaFave insists, "dead wrong"? To illustrate its
point, the Court provided three examples that are best considered
seriatim. In the first example, the hearsay report satisfies Spinelli's
veracity prong but not its basis of knowledge prong.
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual
reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activities
in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set
forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an
absolute bar to a finding of probable cause. 290

One should note that the Court did not say that probable cause always
exists in such cases; it said instead that the informant's failure
"thoroughly" to describe the basis of his knowledge should not be·
an "absolute bar" to a probable cause finding.
In spite of the cautious wording, Professor LaFave maintains that
the Court's assertion "simply is not so. " 291 If the Court is right, LaFave
insists, then an honest officer's conclusory statement to a magistrate
concerning the location of contraband should likewise suffice. 292 The
law, however, does not permit this. 293 In resp~nse to· LaFave, it may
be initially argued that the law's treatment of the honest police officer
perhaps should be reconsidered. Arguably, a conclusory statement from
an officer "known" to the magistrate for the "unusual reliability"
of his or her predictions should suffice. 294 Indeed, even in terms of
two prong analysis, it might be perfectly reasonable to infer a reliable
basis of knowledge in such cases. If, for example, an informant or
a police officer has provided ten reports concerning narcotics, all of
them reliable, it may be reasonable to infer that the individual does
not report information unless it has been reliably obtained. Such an
289. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 137.
290. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2329 (1983).
291. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 137.
292. Id. See also 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that if a statement by
an honest informant could furnish probable cause, then the "affidavit of an officer, known
by the magistrate to be honest and experienced" must a fortiori be acceptable, because the alternative would be "quixotic").
293. I W. Lafave, supra note 3, at 137.
294. In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,424 (1969) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis
added), Justice White said,
Indeed, if the affidavit of an officer, known by the magistrate to be honest and
experienced, stating that gambling equipment is located in a certain building is unacceptable, it. would be quixotic if a similar statement from an honest informant were
found to furnish probable cause. A strong argument can be made that both should
be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment, but under our cases neither is.
Compare the same Justice's statement in Gates, quoted supra note 292.
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inference seems especially reasonable under a probable cause analysis
that asks whether the reasonably cautious person could form a wellgrounded suspicion by relying on the report. One has to be rather
dogmatic to maintain that reliance on a conclusory tip from a person
who has proved reliable ten times is always unreasonable. Yet, in rejecting the Court's example, this is precisely what Professor LaFave
is saying.
In defense of LaFave's position, one may object that in warrant cases
at least, magistrates rather than police officers should determine probable cause. 295 The above analysis, however, does not preclude the
magistrate from making this decision. The magistrate must examine
the informant's or the officer's past history and decide, in light of that
history, whether the current report is sufficiently believable to justify
an arrest or a search. We know from our experiences in life that we
sometimes rely on conclusory statements from ''unusually reliable'' people. LaFave has given us no reason to doubt what our experience
teaches, for he has not demonstrated that the magistrate, acting as
a reasonably cautious person, would necessarily apply a mechanical
two-pronged test whenever deciding that a well-grounded suspicion
existed.
Of course, if an unusually reliable police officer reports only his
or her own conclusions, the magistrate always can ask for more information, a luxury that does not exist when police present the magistrate
with an informant's tip. This may provide a basis for distinguishing
between the unusually reliable informant and the unusually reliable
police officer, for the reasonably cautious magistrate may ask for more
detail when that detail is readily available. Thus, even if LaFave
is correct about the inadequacy of conclusory statements from "honest"
police officers, he has failed to refute the Court's example of the
"unusually reliable" informant. 296
In the Court's second example the hearsay report again satisfies the
veracity prong but not the basis of knowledge prong.
[I]f an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a
report of criminal activity - which if fabricated would subject
him to criminal liability - we have found rigorous scrutiny
of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. 297

295. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
296. If it seems quixotic that more is demanded of a police officer than an informant, see
supra note 292 & 294, the difference is explained by the practicability of obtaining more information from the affiant-officer when he or she has firsthand knowledge. In Gates, of course,
neither the magistrate nor the police could have demanded more from the unknown informant.
297. 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
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The Court then cited Adams v. Williams 298 in support o( this
proposition.
Professor Lafave correctly notes that Adams was a stop and frisk
case that did not evaluate traditional probable cause requirements. 299
LaFave's comment that Adams is "woefully short on analysis" 300 may
also be right, at least with regard to the short shrift the majority gave_
the facts. 301 Finally, Lafave properly observes that although a declaration against interest may tell us something about the declarant's veracity,
it tells us nothing about the declarant's basis of knowledge. 302 None
of this proves, however, that the reasonably cautious person would
never rely on such a declaration from an ''unquestionably honest
citizen" to form a well-grounded suspicion of criminal activity. As I
indicated in discussing the Court's first example, one has to be rather
inflexible to maintain such a position. The Court's example withstands
LaFave's attack if such a report would sometimes satisfy the reasonably
cautious person.
The Court's third example is perhaps the most- provocative.
[E]ven if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives,
his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along
with a statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. 303
As in the other examples, the Court did not say that probable cause
must be found in all such cases. Nevertheless, Professor Lafave finds
this example "bizarre. " 304 He bases his concern on an informant's ability
to fabricate detail and personal observation and correctly insists that
detail cannot help establish veracity. 305
298. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
299. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 137.
300. Id. at 137 & n.22.1'1 (citing 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at§ 9.3(e)). In the cited section
of his text, Lafave relies heavily on the criticism of Adams expressed in The Supreme Court,
1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 179-80 (1972). See 3 W. LAFAVE§ 9.3(e) at 102. For criticism
of the argument in this Note, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
.
301. The majority in Adams said that "[t]he informant was known to [the police officer]
personally and had provided him with information in the past." 407 U.S. at 146. The dissent
reported, however, that the informant had previously given the officer one report of homosexual
activity in the local railroad station, a report that the officer was not able to confirm when
he checked it out. Id. at 156 (Marshall & Douglas, JJ ., dissenting).
302. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 137. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
303. 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
304. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 137.
305. Id. at 138. Justice Harlan, who authored Spinelli, basically agreed with this assertion,
but he was a little more tentative.
[I)t might be of significance that the informant had given a more than ordinarily detailed
description of the suspect's criminal activities. Although this would be more probative
of the reliability of the information, it might also permissibly lead a magistrate, in
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LaFave's criticism, of course, assumes the need to satisfy two independent prongs. We should ask, however, whether the reasonably cautious
person would ever rely on a detailed tip from a person with some
motive to lie. Consider, in this regard, these facts. Police arrested
two individuals, Leisure and James, for a burglary that occurred just
minutes before. Although Leisure remained silent, James admitted guilt
and implicated Leisure in the crime. James also indicated that he had
observed in Leisure's apartment several specified valuables, which
Leisure boasted he had stolen in a previous burglary. Finally, James
stated that Leisure had instructed his girlfriend, James's sister, to destroy
these items if Leisure failed to return from the present crime. 306
If we evaluate these facts from a Spinelli perspective, we see that
James claimed a reliable basis of knowledge, but unfortunately we know
nothing about his honesty. 307 Worse, James may have had some motive
to lie, because displaying a willingness to cooperate could help curry
favor with the authorities. We might attempt to discount his motive
to lie by arguing that James must have realized that he would hurt
his relationship with the police by sending them on a wild-goose
chase, but this is not fully persuasive. After all, James may deliberately have established the groundwork for a subsequent explanation by
adding the detail about Leisure's instructions to his girlfriend. Thus,
the veracity prong remains problematic, because we are left with "some
doubt" about James's motives.
Although some might hesitate to act on the basis of James's report,
the relevant question is whether the reasonably cautious officer or
magistrate necessarily would find probable cause lacking. The answer
should be obvious. It belies our life experiences to insist that the
reasonably cautious person could not have a well-grounded suspicion
that Leisure kept stolen goods in his apartment. Similarly, it betrays
a terribly skewed perspective to insist that a reasonable person could
only conclude from these facts that Leisure's privacy interest in his
apartment necessarily outweighed his community's interest in trying
to recover stolen goods. Our common sense precludes us from defending such an intransigent position. 308
Consider, now, a more troubling case. A social worker received an
anonymous phone call at suppertime reporting that two children, who
an otherwise close case, to credit the accuracy of the account as well.
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 593 (1971) (Harlan, Douglas, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
306. Leisure v. State, 437 So. 2d 751 (Fla. App. 1983). The police immediately "seized"
Leisure's apartment and then obtained a warrant to search it.
307. Id. at 753.
308. Relying on Gates, the Florida Court of Appeals concluded "that under the totality of
circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe evidence of criminal activity could be
found inside appellant's apartment." Id.
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lived with Calvin Boggess but had different last names, may have been
battered. The caller stated that one of the children was limping, that
he had seen bruises on this child, and that he believed the child might
need medical attention. Moreover, the caller said that he knew the Boggesses fairly well and that Mr. Boggess had a bad temper. The social
worker who received the call reported it to another social worker who,
along with a policeman, went to Boggess's house. Although he was
told about the call, Boggess refused to let the two into his house to
observe the children.
Imagine, for a moment, that you are the officer. What should or
would you do when Boggess refuses to let you enter? 309 Under Spinelli's
test, this case is even more difficult than the one involving Leisure
and James, because here both prongs are arguably deficient. The informant claimed that he personally observed only some bruises, not
any beating. Moreover, the informant did not give any basis for his
suspicion that one of the children possibly needed medical attention.
In any event, even if we infer personal observation, the veracity prong
remains unsatisfied.
My unscientific sampling of lawyers and law professors suggests that
reasonable people differ in their responses to this fact situation. Some
want more corroboration before concluding that a forcible entry is proper. Others, however, want to enter immediately after Boggess's refusal
to cooperate. Some, like me, vacillate back and forth. If my survey
is accurate, the two prong deficiency does not prevent some reasonable
people from concluding that an immediate search· is reasonable. For
these people, the two-pronged test itself would be unreasonable as applied to these facts.
It may now be helpful to modify the facts. Assume that the caller
had said the the injured child was lying on the floor, semi-conscious
and bleeding profusely. Assume, furthermore, that everything else remains exactly the same. Certainly these modified facts would increase
our willingness to permit immediately entry, yet from a two-pronged
perspective nothing whatsoever has changed. Because the quantity of
detail is no greater than in the original report, we would still find it
difficult to infer a reliable basis of knowledge. In any event, the new
detail provides nothing to rescue the deficient veracity prong. Yet, I
feel confident in stating that on these modified facts many more
reasonable readers (hopefully most) would be prepared to make a forcible entry. 310
309. I have deliberately refrained from indicating whether any children in fact were battered.
Hindsight knowledge, either way, can too easily influence analysis. Thus, you as reader are no
more enlightened than the officer at the door.
310. The facts before my modification are taken from State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 443, 340
N.W.2d 516 (1983). For what it is worth, the social worker and police officer entered and found
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This example should illustrate that the reasonably cautious person
does not always require Spinelli's two prongs to be satisfied before
an arrest or a search can be made. Rather, as I have argued throughout this article, the reasonable person examines the totality of circumstances and balances the competing interests. The need for immediate action is always a relevant consideration in probable cause
analysis, 311 and it remains relevant when hearsay is being used to
establish probable cause. Similarly, the gravity of harm, in my example the possible loss of a child's life, is always relevant, 312 and it too
remains relevant when hearsay is involved. Finally, the intrusiveness
of the contemplated action remains relevant in hearsay cases. 313 An
entry into a home is a serious intrusion, but an entry to examine two
children is not as intrusive as an entry to rummage through closets
and drawers.
If a commonsense balancing of interests is appropriate in cases not
involving hearsay, it is equally appropriate when hearsay is involved.
The only difference in hearsay cases is that we must factor the likelihood
of unreliability into the analysis. In short, the reasonable person has
to discount the harm that the arrest or search seeks to avoid by the
perceived likelihood of a false report; this discounted harm must then
be measured against the harm that will result from the contemplated
intrusion. This analysis should not be expressed mathematically, because
reasonable people (who are not economists) do not normally assign
numerical values to harms and risks, and, even if they did, they would
surely differ on what numbers to assign. 314 Yet, in a rough and imprecise way, such a balancing analysis is exactly what common sense
dictates. Under a commonsense approach, the reasonably cautious person would factor into the probable cause evaluation a necessarily imprecise judgment about the hearsay report's reliability. He or she would
not apply a rigidly defined reliability test that rejects hearsay altogether

one child, aged five, with part of his lip missing and with bruises on both legs, from the ankles
to the thighs, and on his arms, from the elbows to the wrists. The child, who limped when
he walked, also had hair missing from his head. The other child also had bruises. 115 Wis.
at 447, 340 N.W.2d at 520. In a somewhat confusing opinion that failed to keep separate the
probable cause and search warrant issues, the court upheld the warrantless entry.
311. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found
both considerations mentioned in the text relevant. "The totality of circumstances in this case
must ... be evaluated within the context of a possible emergency situation, which, by its very
nature, involves potentially serious consequences if immediate action is not taken, and necessarily
demands a prompt assessment of the information that is available." 115 Wis. at 455, 340 N.W.2d
at 523.
313. See supra text accompanying note 248.
314. As I have previously indicated, post-search judicial review should recognize that reasonable
people can reasonably disagree over such assessments. See supra notes 252-86 and accompanying
text. But see infra note 315.
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whenever one of the commonly used prongs of reliability cannot be
satisfied. 315
In criticizing Gates, Professor LaFave observed that common sense
requires attention to both veracity and basis of knowledge. 316 Common sense does require attention to these indices of reliability. Common sense, however, does not require the elevation of these indices
into talismanic tests that must be satisfied in every case. Professor
LaFave's vehement criticisms notwithstanding, it is Spinelli's rigidity,
not Oates's flexibility, that defies common sense and thereby "makes
a mockery of the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement." 317
POSTSCRIPT -

A NOTE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Early in this century, the Supreme Court adhered to the view that
Bill of Rights protections applied to the states only if they were "of
the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." 318 Under this approach, the Bill of Rights had little application to the states. States
were not required to furnish even basic protections like the right to
trial by jury and the right of a person not to be compelled to become
a witness against himself, because one can imagine a free society, one
with ordered liberty, that does not recognize such rights. 319 One cannot, however, imagine a free society without some protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. By definition, a society that permits its police to search or arrest whenever and whomever they please
is not a free society. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court

315. But see 115 Wis. at 462-75, 340 N.W.2d at 527-32 (Abrahamson, J ., dissenting). At
one point, the dissent found it significant that purportedly only thirty percent of anonymous
child abuse reports turn out to be valid. Id. at 474, 340 N.W.2d at 532. This, of course, reveals
a lot about the dissent's view concerning the degree of certainty that probable cause requires.
The dissent also argued that the case required the court to balance the defendant's privacy interests against the possible need of the children for protection. Id. at 474-75, 340 N.W.2d at
532. The dissent's view that more investigation should have occurred - reasonable people, as
stated, can disagree about this - is not as remarkable as its position that the officer's contrary
conclusion was outside the bounds of reason. Unfortunately, the dissent's defiance of common
sense was influenced by Professor LaFave's criticism of Gates. Id. at 471 n.5, 340 N.W.2d at
531 n.5.
316. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 138.
317. Id. (criticizing Gates).
318. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
319. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (fifth amendment protection against
compulsory self-incrimination does not apply to the states); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908) (same); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603-05 (1900) (states not required to provide
trial by jury). The Court overruled Adamson and Twining in Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I
(1964); it rejected Maxwell in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
The Court had to modify its inquiry to make these Bill of Rights protections applicable to
the states. It began asking whether a particular procedure "is necessary to an Anglo- American
regime of ordered liberty." 391 U.S. at 149 n.14.
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applied the fourth amendment's "core" protections to the states well
before it required the states to abide by most other provsions in the
Bill of Rights. 320
The fourth amendment, therefore, should be viewed along with a
few other safeguards, such as the first amendment's protection of
political speech, 321 as a bulwark of civil liberty and of freedom itself.
Even recognizing this, however, the task remains of identifying the
conduct that the fourth amendment proscribes as unreasonable. Over
the past few years, I have been attempting to develop a comprehensive
outlook on fourth amendment issues. I have criticized Supreme Court
decisions that by narrowly defining the word "search" have totally
immunized very intrusive governmental behavior from judicial review. 322
Likewise, I have criticized Supreme Court decisions that have permitted police to make warrantless searches in the absence of exigent
circumstances. 323 This article in no way is inconsistent with these previous
criticisms; on the contrary, it completes the basic structure of a comprehensive approach toward the fourth amendment.
I still believe that all governmental activity that intrudes upon informational privacy should be brought under the fourth amendment's umbrella. I believe that, whenever practicable, these intrusions should be
subjected to the scrutiny of a neutral, disinterested magistrate before
the intrusion occurs. This article has addressed the evidentiary burden
that the government must carry before such an intrusion should be
permitted. I have argued that the government's burden should not be
defined at so high a level that it impedes legitimate law enforcement
interests. We need not interpret the fourth amendment's probable cause
requirement to leave us so secure against encroachments by government that we are left insecure against predatory behavior by our fell ow
citizens, behavior that also may destroy our liberty, our pursuit of happiness, and sometimes our very lives. 324 I have attempted to demonstrate
that neither history nor common sense compels such a restrictive view
of the probable cause requirement.
320. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). Wolf refused, however, to apply the
exclusionary remedy for fourth amendment violations to the states. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), overruled this part of Wolf.
32 I. The Court recognized early in this century that the constitution proscribed to some extent
the ability of states to punish speech. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Freedom
of speech and protection from arbitrary arrest and search are perhaps the quintessential hallmarks
of a free society.
322. See Grano, supra note 271, at 428-44.
323. See Grano, supra note 172, at 638-50.
324. The dissent in State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 462, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983), adopts such
an interpretation of the fourth amendment. Boggess is discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 309-15.
We should know something is terribly wrong when, for example, almost everyone in a city
neighborhood seems to know that a certain residence is being used for narcotics transactions
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The fourth amendment approach I advocate would constitutionally
deny government the unrestricted license it presently possesses to inspect an individual's bank records 325 or to ascertain all qf the persons
an individual has called on the phone. 326 Like the search of one's private
cabinet, this governmental activity intrudes upon our informational
privacy, and it should be subject to fourth amendment control. The
most appropriate control would be to subject such governmental activity
to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. With this accomplished,
we would be adequately protected by a standard permitting such intrusions when the government can demonstrate a focused, well-grounded
suspicion that it would find evidence of criminal activity. This standard would prevent arbitrary governmental conduct, like conquct
employed purely for harassment purposes or as part of a fishing expedition, the prevention of which lies at the "core" of the fourth amendment's concerns.
My past criticisms of the Court have been directed at many decisions written or joined by Justice Rehnquist. In Gates, however,
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was absolutely correct. Although
it may be anathema to some, I think it appropriate to conclude this
article with these apt words from Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
"Fidelity" to the commands of the Constitution suggests
balanced judgment rather than exhortation. The highest
"fidelity" is achieved neither by the judge who instinctively
goes furthest in upholding even the most bizarre claim of individual constitutional rights, any more than it is achieved by
a judge who instinctively goes furthest in accepting the most
restrictive claims of government authorities. The task of this
Court, as of other courts, is to "hold the balance true" .... 327

but the police insist that they have insufficient cause to act. While such accounts may seem
apocryphal or anecdotal to some, one hears of them too frequently to ignore them altogether.
To the extent such accounts have some basis in fact, the perceived inability of the police to
act makes a mockery of the fourth amendment.
325. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (examination of an individual's bank records
is not a fourth amendment search).
326. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (use of pen register to detect numbers dialed
from residential phone is not a search).
327. lllinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2333-34 (1983).

